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FORSAKEN HEROES: COVID-19 AND FRONTLINE 
ESSENTIAL WORKERS 
James J. Brudney* 
“Who sees with equal eye, as God of all, A hero perish, or a sparrow fall, 
Atoms or systems into ruin hurl’d, And now a bubble burst, and now a 
world.” 
– An Essay on Man, Epistle 1, Alexander Pope (1734) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tin Aye emigrated from a refugee camp in Thailand to Colorado in 2007 
with her husband and two children.  She worked at the JBS meatpacking 
plant in Greeley.  On May 17, 2020, she died of complications from 
COVID-19 after being hospitalized on a ventilator for seven weeks.  At the 
time, Aye, age 60, was the eighth JBS Greeley employee (and seventh 
worker) confirmed to have died from COVID-19; 316 plant workers had 
tested positive by May 17.1 
Sandra Kunz, a Walmart cashier, died on April 20, 2020, from 
complications related to the coronavirus.  Despite being 72 years old with a 
lung condition, Kunz continued working — her husband was injured and out 
of work, and the couple had bills to pay.  Public health and worker safety 
experts recognize the register as the most dangerous place in the store.  
Cashiers work at arm’s length from customers all day, making social 
distancing virtually impossible.2 
When the COVID-19 pandemic engulfed the United States in early 2020, 
the concept of essential workers rose to prominence.  While the category 
became a focus for media coverage and political debate, its definition and 
boundaries have been somewhat fluid.  According to the Department of 
Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
Advisory Memorandum, the category covers 17 broad groups of workers, 
amounting to almost half of the workforce.3  And the CISA guidance, 
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 1. See Jeremy Harlan, A Refugee and New Grandmother Was the Eighth Employee at a 
Colorado Meat Packing Plant to Die from Coronavirus, CNN (May 18, 2020, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/18/us/jbs-employee-dies/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2KRJ-X3SV]. 
 2. See Nathaniel Meyersohn, This Is the Most Dangerous Place in the Grocery Store, 
CNN (May 1, 2020, 7:56 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/30/business/grocery-stores-coronavirus-cashiers/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/P44D-WA8E]. 
 3. CISA is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency within the Department 
of Homeland Security. See Advisory Memorandum from Christopher C. Krebs, Dir., 
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency (CISA) (May 19, 2020) [hereinafter Advisory 
Memorandum], 
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Version_3.1_CISA_Guidance_on_Esse
ntial_Critical_Infrastructure_Workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GRE-FTXQ]; see also US 
States with the Most Essential Workers, UNITED WAY NAT’L CAP. AREA, 
https://unitedwaynca.org/stories/us-states-essential-workers/ [https://perma.cc/MHE3-82Z6] 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2020). 
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intended to be overly broad,4 has spawned a range of state responses as to 
what constitutes “essential work.”5 
These varied definitional approaches bypass an important distinction 
among essential workers: those who basically work from home versus those 
who must travel to their jobs and interact with coworkers and the public on 
a regular basis.  The 40% of essential workers who can work from home 
have not been unduly vulnerable or precarious.6  If anything, they were 
among the fortunate who could count on reasonably steady income in a safe 
workspace at a time when one-quarter of the working population was 
experiencing unemployment or pay reductions.7  On the other hand, roughly 
60% of essential workers — often referred to as frontline essential (FE) — 
can only do their jobs in person. 
FE workers are the subject of this Article.  The health and safety risks that 
they endure in service to the economy and country have made them heroes, 
supportively portrayed in the media and celebrated in cities at a designated 
early evening hour.8  What these heroes have not received is adequate 
workplace health and safety rights or protections. 
 
 4. See Advisory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5. 
 5. Some states embraced the federal guidance as definitional but added more categories 
of workers. See, e.g., Order of Alabama State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public 
Gatherings Due to Risk of Infection by COVID-19 (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://governor.alabama.gov/assets/2020/04/Final-Statewide-Order-4.3.2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/42B5-KMST] (adding religious entities). Other states deferred to the federal 
guidance. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.14.20.01 (Apr. 2, 2020) (adopting the definition 
of “critical infrastructure” from CISA). And still other states endorsed the CISA categories 
but defined them more narrowly with distinct relevance to their own economies. See, e.g., 
Cal. Exec. Order No. 33-20 (Mar. 19, 2020); Essential Workforce, CAL. ST. PUB. HEALTH 
OFFICER (Apr. 28, 2020), 
https://covid19.ca.gov/img/EssentialCriticalInfrastructureWorkers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9QPS-5ZFN]. 
 6. Bankers are an example of essential workers operating from home; they process 
emergency-relief loans for small businesses and coach customers by phone as they navigate 
online or mobile banking. See Laura Alix, Coronavirus Through the Eyes of Front-Line 
Bankers, AM. BANKER (May 13, 2020, 9:30 PM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/coronavirus-through-the-eyes-of-front-line-bankers 
[https://perma.cc/9WNS-K47X]. One academic report identifies the CISA guidance as 
covering over half the total workforce, with 40% of that total not needing to work on the front 
lines on a regular basis. See Francine D. Blau et al., Essential and Frontline Workers in the 
COVID-19 Crisis, ECONOFACT (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://econofact.org/essential-and-frontline-workers-in-the-covid-19-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/NDN3-YGUZ]. 
 7. See Andrew Soergel, Survey: 1 in 4 Americans Has Lost Job or Income to 
Coronavirus, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2020-04-08/1-in-4-americans-has-lost-job-
or-income-to-coronavirus-survey [https://perma.cc/DP2H-QLLB]. 
 8. See Peter Marks, The Nightly Ovation for Hospital Workers May Be New York’s 
Greatest Performance, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2020, 6:15 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/theater_dance/the-nightly-ovation-for-hospi
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In addition to individuals like Tin Aye and Sandra Kunz, FE workers 
encompass at least six identified frontline industry groupings: (1) grocery, 
convenience, and drug store workers; (2) healthcare professionals and 
support personnel; (3) public transit workers; (4) janitors and building 
cleaners; (5) trucking, warehouse, and postal workers; and (6) childcare and 
social service workers.9  They produce, process, or deliver vital goods and 
services at their regular workplaces, interacting with patients, customers, 
clients, and fellow workers. 
There are more than 30 million FE workers in the United States, 
comprising over 20% of the workforce.10  Although demographic trends vary 
across industries, FE workers are overall less white, more Black, more 
female, more foreign born, and more likely to live in low-income families 
than the U.S. population as a whole.11  FE workers also bear disproportionate 
health risks — as evidenced by higher rates of infection, serious illness, and 
death.12 
In the face of these risks, there has been a conspicuous lack of federal 
leadership in protecting FE workers.  One federal law enacted during the 
 
tal-workers-may-be-new-yorks-greatest-performance/2020/04/06/e443195c-7795-11ea-a130
-df573469f094_story.html [https://perma.cc/7UPK-DPFC]; Janet I. Tu, Seattleites 
Encouraged to Make ‘Joyful Noise’ Thursday Night in Appreciation of Front Line Workers 




 9. See HYE JIN RHO ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RSCH., A BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC 
PROFILE OF WORKERS IN FRONTLINE INDUSTRIES 5–6 (2020) [hereinafter CEPR REPORT], 
https://cepr.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020-04-Frontline-Workers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QLF6-ZG2C]. There are a multitude of figures circulating regarding the 
number and demographic breakdown of FE workers. The Article relies on data compiled by 
the Center for Economic and Policy Research, which uses American Community Survey Data 
from 2014–2018 and defines frontline industries under the six groupings in the text. These 
groupings are also used by the New York City Comptroller, among others. See OFF. OF THE 
N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, NEW YORK CITY’S FRONTLINE WORKERS (2020) [hereinafter NYC 
FRONTLINE WORKERS], 
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Frontline_Workers_032020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G7WA-DN3N]. For more details on the six groupings, see infra Part I. 
 10. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1. For a more expansive view of FE workers 
and essential workers overall, see Adie Tomer & Joseph W. Kane, To Protect Frontline 
Workers During and After COVID-19, We Must Define Who They Are, BROOKINGS (June 10, 
2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/to-protect-frontline-workers-during-and-after-covid-19-
we-must-define-who-they-are/ [https://perma.cc/2LZD-JDCT] (identifying 50 million FE 
workers, 55% of 90 million total essential workers, and over 30% of total U.S. employment). 
 11. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 3–4, 7 tbl.1. In New York City, more than 50% 
of frontline workers are foreign born, which is almost three times the national average. See 
NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9, at 2–4; see also CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 
tbl.1 (finding 17.3% of frontline workers are foreign born). 
 12. See infra notes 44–52 and accompanying text. 
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pandemic provides for paid sick leave, but only to a fraction of those working 
in FE jobs — and the Department of Labor (DOL) has weakened the 
provisions Congress approved.13  With respect to protections such as 
mandatory personal protective equipment (PPE), social distancing 
requirements, hazard or premium pay, and application of existing or 
emergency safety standards, DOL has promulgated mild forms of guidance 
that offer little meaningful protection and has engaged in virtually no 
enforcement.14  A handful of state and local governments have taken partial 
steps to fill in these large gaps.15  Overall, the law’s response has been 
fragmented and disappointing. 
Some additional protections have resulted from collective bargaining or 
lobbying efforts by unions.16  Of particular relevance are union efforts to 
secure congressional protection for the airline industry that covers up to two 
million employees.17  These major industry-wide payroll and job protective 
provisions differ dramatically from the law’s traditional employer-specific 
responses to job losses and pandemic conditions in general.18  The 
exceptional nature of the industry-wide approach illustrates challenges faced 
by the great majority of FE workers who, like the great majority of workers 
nationally, lack union representation that can help them secure such 
protections. 
At the same time, the COVID-19 crisis presents an opportunity for some 
basic rethinking of how the law regulates workplace safety and health.  To 
start, federal law must address safety and health protections more 
substantially in industry-wide terms.  Rather than relegating millions of FE 
workers to the piecemeal responses described below, this Article contends 
that safety and health regulation needs to develop on an occupational or 
sectoral basis to complement existing firm-specific approaches.  Further, 
safety and health protests driven by unusually hazardous conditions such as 
COVID-19 deserve meaningful protection that the law does not currently 
provide.  To that end, federal law regulating the scope and consequences of 
lawful strikes must be reformed. 
 
 13. See infra Section II.A. 
 14. See infra Sections II.B–C. 
 15. See infra Sections II.A–D. 
 16. See infra Section II.F. 
 17. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116–
136, tit. IV, §§ 4114–4120, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). 
 18. For detailed discussion of the industry-wide airline provisions of the CARES Act, as 
contrasted with the employer-specific unemployment insurance approach characteristic of 
U.S. responses, see infra Section II.F. 
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Part I of this Article explores the composition of the FE workforce, 
including its demographics and income levels, union status, and extent of 
COVID-19 exposure.  Part II addresses in detail the state of legal protection 
for FE workers, assessing inadequacies in the laws as written and 
implemented.  Part III reflects on the two aspects of legislative change just 
mentioned, explaining how they can help address the safety and health 
deficits FE workers (and millions of others) have confronted during the 
pandemic.19 
The impact of COVID-19 vividly demonstrates that the nature and extent 
of health risks vary with the working conditions experienced in different 
industries and occupation groups.  For FE workers whose lives and health 
are most at risk, a comparable sectoral or industry-wide framework must play 
a key part in legislative and regulatory responses.  Possible models for such 
a sectoral approach exist — in tripartite arrangements on wages that have 
featured federal and state government participation, and in past and present 
industry-wide collective bargaining agreements.20 
COVID-19 also has shown how grave workplace hazards can arise with 
little or no warning and persist or worsen if unaddressed.  Yet our conception 
of protected forms of worker protest against such hazards has withered over 
decades of adverse court and agency rulings.21  Labor law currently provides 
limited protection for peaceful grievance-related strikes motivated by health 
and safety concerns, or for health and safety refusals to work in abnormally 
dangerous conditions.  These minimal protections should be extended: by 
expanding the definition of strikes to cover intermittent or repeated 
safety-related walkouts and slowdowns, with or without a union presence, 
and by prohibiting permanent replacements for all such protest actions.22 
Finally, this Article refers briefly to the unresolved challenges of 
immigration law reform — for FE workers in various occupational sectors 
where non-citizens are vital to performance, it is well past time for legislative 
or regulatory action. 
 
 19. Reflection occurs at a time when a major labor law reform bill has passed the House 
of Representatives but has little prospect of success in the Senate during the current Congress; 
the bill’s provisions do not address workplace safety and health generally or the pandemic in 
particular. See Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2019, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2020); 
Eli Rosenberg, House Passes Bill to Rewrite Labor Laws and Strengthen Unions, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 6, 2020, 9:21 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/02/06/house-passes-bill-rewrite-labor-laws
-strengthen-unions/ [https://perma.cc/2K53-TGHX]. 
 20. See infra Section III.A. 
 21. See Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (July 25, 2019); Elk Lumber Co., 91 
N.L.R.B. 333 (1950); Int’l Union, UAW. Am. v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949); 
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
 22. See infra Section III.B. 
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I. THE COVID-19 FRONTLINE ESSENTIAL WORKFORCE 
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) March 19 
Advisory Memorandum listed a vast range of “operations and services that 
are typically essential to continued critical infrastructure viability.”23  But 
the federal government has not drawn a distinction between essential 
occupations where operations and services can be performed largely or 
exclusively from home, and frontline essential occupations where workers 
must provide their labor in person.  That distinction has emerged at the state 
and local government level, and through analyses conducted by researchers.  
Moreover, the six industry categories relied on here24 do not address variance 
among specific occupations.  For instance, the grocery, convenience, and 
drug store category does not distinguish backroom workers, shelf stockers, 
and cashiers.  Nonetheless, the six categories, ranging from 800,000 workers 
(public transit) to 16 million (healthcare providers and support personnel, of 
whom college-educated professionals are an overall minority), reveal 
considerable information about the nature of those who perform frontline 
work. 
A. Demographics 
Racial trends among the six categories are perhaps the most revealing.  
For each of the six, the proportion of Black workers is higher than that of the 
national average, and for all FE workers combined, it is more than 40% 
higher.25  For trucking, warehouse, and postal workers; healthcare workers; 
and childcare and social service workers, the proportion who are Black is 
substantially higher than the national average for all workers — among 
public transit workers and in meatpacking, it is more than double the national 
average.26 
 
 23. See Advisory Memorandum, supra note 3. The Advisory Memorandum has been 
updated several times since it was released in March 2020. 
 24. The categories are grocery, convenience, and drug stores; public transit; trucking, 
warehouse, and postal service; building cleaning services; healthcare; and childcare and social 
services. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 5–6; NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9, 
at 2. The healthcare and social service worker components are focused on non-government 
employees providing services. See NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9, at 8. 
 25. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1 (finding 17.0% of FE workers are Black 
whereas the national average is 11.9%). In New York City, the proportion of FE workers who 
are Black is even higher — more than double the national average for the entire workforce. 
See NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9. 
 26. The national average is 18.2% for trucking, warehouse, and postal service; 17.5% for 
healthcare; 19.3% for childcare and social services; 26.0% for public transit; and 25.2% for 
meatpacking. CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1; see also Shawn Fremstad, Hye Jin Rho 
& Hayley Brown, Meatpacking Workers Are a Diverse Group Who Need Better Protections, 
CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RSCH. (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://cepr.net/meatpacking-workers-are-a-diverse-group-who-need-better-protections/#:~:t
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The share of Latinx workers in grocery, convenience, and drug stores; in 
trucking, warehouses, and postal service; and in childcare and social services 
exceeds the national average.  That share is more than double the national 
average among building cleaning services workers,27 as is the proportion of 
foreign-born workers in building cleaning services.28  Immigrants are 
significantly overrepresented in other essential occupations: over half of 
frontline meatpacking workers are immigrants, as are more than one-fourth 
of home health aides.29  Additional studies of FE workers use somewhat 
different datasets and reach similar conclusions: these workers are 





 27. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9. The national average is 16.8%; it is 18.0% for 
childcare and social services; 18.5% for grocery, convenience, and drug stores; 20.0% for 
trucking, warehouse, and postal service; and 40.2% for building cleaning services. Id. at 7 
tbl.1. In New York City, the proportion of FE workers who are Latinx is again, considerably 
higher than the average for all workers, including 60% of cleaning workers. Overall, 75% of 
New York City’s FE workers are individuals of color, compared with 41.2% of FE workers 
across the country. NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9. 
 28. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1 (finding 38.2% of building cleaning 
services workers are foreign born whereas the national average of all workers is 17.1%). 
 29. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9 (home health aides); Fremstad et al., supra note 26 
(meatpacking workers). 
 30. See MIKE NICHOLSON & DANIELA ALULEMA, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. OF N.Y., 
IMMIGRANTS COMPRISE 31 PERCENT OF WORKERS IN NEW YORK STATE ESSENTIAL BUSINESSES 
AND 70 PERCENT OF THE STATE’S UNDOCUMENTED LABOR FORCE WORKS IN ESSENTIAL 
BUSINESSES (2020), 
https://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Printable-New-York-Essential-Workers-Rep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNR3-2LEK]; Julia Gelatt, Immigrant Workers: Vital to the U.S. 
COVID-19 Response, Disproportionately Vulnerable, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 2020), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigrant-workers-us-covid-19-response 
[https://perma.cc/5EG8-63GW]; Audrey Kearney & Cailey Muñana, Taking Stock of 
Essential Workers, KFF (May 1, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-policy-watch/taking-stock-of-essential-workers/ 
[https://perma.cc/EMZ9-LNB7]; Celine McNicholas & Margaret Poydock, Who Are 
Essential Workers?, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (May 19, 2020, 11:25 AM), 
https://www.epi.org/blog/who-are-essential-workers-a-comprehensive-look-at-their-wages-d
emographics-and-unionization-rates/ [https://perma.cc/3Z4M-LP8W]; Tomer & Kane, supra 
note 10. 
 31. See, e.g., NICHOLSON & ALULEMA, supra note 30 (immigrants comprise 31% of 
workers in New York State essential businesses, and 70% of New York’s undocumented labor 
force are essential workers); Gelatt, supra note 30 (immigrants are substantially 
overrepresented as pharmacists, butchers and meat processors, and workers in manufacturing 
of food, medicines, and soap/cleaning agents); Kearney & Muñana, supra note 30 (FE 
workers are three times more likely to be Black than other essential workers); Tomer & Kane, 
supra note 10 (Black and Hispanic/Latino workers are overrepresented as industrial truck 
operators, slaughterers and meatpackers, nursing assistants, and correctional officers). 
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Data regarding the sex of FE workers are also revealing.  In four of the six 
categories, more than half the workers are female, compared to 48% of the 
workforce as a whole.  More than three-quarters in healthcare, and also 
childcare and social services, are women.  Overall, 64% of FE workers are 
female.32 
FE workers are more likely than the workforce as a whole to be 
compensated at below 200% of the federal poverty line, a measure 
recognized to reflect low-income employment.33  Workers in three 
categories — grocery, convenience, and drug stores; building cleaning 
services; and childcare and social services — are substantially more likely 
to live in households below twice the poverty line.34  Relatedly, FE workers 
report more difficulty meeting necessary expenses such as food, utilities, and 
credit card bills during the pandemic,35 prompting proposals for hazard pay 
for those workers.36  Lower levels of education often accompany lower 
income — that is the case here as well.  FE workers are likelier to have a 
high school degree at most when compared with the workforce as a whole, 
and less likely to have a four-year college or post-graduate degree.37 
B. Union Representation 
The overwhelming majority of FE workers lack union representation, as 
is true for private-sector workers in general.  Although data on union 
representation from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) do not align 
 
 32. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 8 tbl.2. In public transit and trucking, warehouse, 
and postal service, women comprise less than 30% of the workforce. The breakdowns by sex 
are comparable to New York City’s. See NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9. For an 
analysis of how the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated existing racial and gender inequalities, 
in particular for women of color, see Catherine Powell, Color of Covid and Gender of Covid: 
Essential Workers, Not Disposable People, 32 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 2021). 
 33. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 4. The 2020 federal poverty income level for a 
family of four is $26,200. See Federal Poverty Level (FPL), HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl/ 
[https://perma.cc/X9HQ-CXV7] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). For recognition that twice this 
official level is a broadly accepted metric for low-wage employment and living circumstances, 
see Heather Koball & Yang Jiang, Basic Facts About Low-Income Children, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
CHILD. POVERTY (Jan. 2018), 
http://www.nccp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/text_1194.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PPM5-LKNU]. 
 34. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1 (finding 20.6% for all workers versus 30% 
for childcare and social services; 30.1% for grocery, convenience, and drug store; and 42.4% 
for building cleaning services). In New York City, the proportions for these three groups are 
comparable or higher: 34%, 35%, and 39%, respectively. NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra 
note 9. 
 35. See Kearney & Muñana, supra note 30, at 3. 
 36. See infra Section II.D. 
 37. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1; Blau et al., supra note 6, at 5–6; Tomer & 
Kane, supra note 10, at 11. 
10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
directly with the FE worker categories discussed here, some categories are 
comparable.  Private-sector union representation, which overall constitutes 
7.1% of that workforce, ranges from 4.7% for retail trade workers to 8.3% 
for healthcare support workers, 9.7% for building and grounds cleaners, and 
13.7% for healthcare practitioners.38  Although these levels of union 
representation are quite modest, represented workers receive higher 
compensation — 4.4% to 22% higher, depending on the category.39 
Apart from advantages in compensation, union workers enjoy more safety 
and health benefits and protections than their non-union counterparts.  In 
relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, these protections include greater access 
to paid sick days, likelier coverage under employer-provided health 
insurance, collectively bargained requirements for safety and health 
equipment, and the ability to report unsafe working conditions without 
retaliation.40  To take one example, the United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) represents workers at grocery stores and meat processing 
plants across the country.  The union has negotiated for premium pay, paid 
sick leave, and PPE for tens of thousands of workers since the pandemic 
began.41  These and other safety and health protections are especially 
important for FE workers, who bear a disproportionate risk of COVID-19 
infection. 
C. Risks of Infection 
Inevitably, there will be widespread infection, hospitalization, and death 
in the midst of a pandemic.  Healthcare professionals bear the highest 
exposure risks in the workforce, and the death toll for these workers 
 
 38. Table 3: Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and 
Industry, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5KM-RLBA]. By 
contrast, local government employees have 39% union representation nationally, and public 
transit workers are among those benefiting substantially from such representation. See id. 
 39. Compensation is 4.4% higher in retail trades, 9.4% for healthcare practitioners, 16% 
for healthcare support workers, and 22% for building and grounds cleaners. Table 4: Median 
Weekly Earnings of Full-time Wage and Salary Workers by Union Affiliation, Occupation, 
and Industry, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t04.htm [https://perma.cc/99SG-PA5Y]. 
 40. See McNicholas & Poydock, supra note 30, at 5 (discussing these advantages in some 
detail). 
 41. See id. See generally Press Release, United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union, 
Unions Representing Health Care Professionals Call on CDC to Reconsider Protections 
During Coronavirus Outbreak (Mar. 6, 2020), http://www.ufcw.org/coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/46YR-ZDTD] (calling on the CDC to strengthen protections for first 
responders fighting the coronavirus outbreak). For a fuller discussion of protections secured 
through union representation and collective bargaining, see infra Section II.F. 
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continues to rise.42  Non-healthcare frontline occupations such as bus drivers 
and other transit workers, childcare and social service workers, cashiers, and 
food preparation workers are also ranked as higher risk,43 and these workers 
are more often exposed without adequate training, PPE, or social distancing 
requirements.  As these occupations are disproportionately non-white, it is 
unsurprising that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reports rates of 
hospitalization and death significantly higher among the Black and Latinx 
populations than among whites.44  The higher rates of morbidity and 
mortality also reflect the impact of factors besides job-related exposures, 
including substandard housing conditions and inequities in healthcare 
insurance and services.45 
With respect to infection data for specific occupations, underreporting of 
confirmed cases and deaths is widespread.  Among healthcare providers, 
mild or asymptomatic infections are less likely to be tested and less likely to 
be reported.46  Among meatpacking plants, the true infection rate is 
“anyone’s guess” because many plants and even state and local health 
officials refuse to provide the number of illnesses.47  A similar problem exists 
with the grocery store industry, where employees may not report from fear 
of retaliation, and employers do not provide data, citing concerns about the 
 
 42. See Lost on the Frontline, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 28, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2020/aug/11/lost-on-the-frontline-covi
d-19-coronavirus-us-healthcare-workers-deaths-database [https://perma.cc/HK2A-YZSC]. 
 43. See Marcus Lu, The Front Line: Visualizing the Occupations with the Highest 
COVID-19 Risk, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-front-line-visualizing-the-occupations-with-the-highest
-covid-19-risk/ [https://perma.cc/93BK-WKZW]; see also OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19, at 18–
20 (2020) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19], 
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3990.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U6U-Y75Y]. 
 44. See COVIDView: A Weekly Surveillance Summary of U.S. COVID-19 Activity, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covidview/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/GY8W-XNYW] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) (reporting hospitalization rates 
by race and ethnicity, March 1 to October 31, 2020). 
 45. See Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 24, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities
.html [https://perma.cc/Z5FQ-D2K6]. 
 46. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Characteristics of Health Care Personnel 
with COVID-19 — United States, February 12–April 9, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 477, 479 (2020). 
 47. See Michael Corkery et al., As Meatpacking Plants Reopen, Data About Worker 
Illness Remains Elusive, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/business/coronavirus-meatpacking-plants-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/KE9Y-5KBL]. 
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health, safety, and privacy of their workers.48  Notwithstanding these 
reporting inadequacies, partial data collected on meatpackers, grocery 
workers, healthcare personnel, and transit workers as of late August 2020 
reveal over 200,000 positive tests and more than a thousand deaths.49 
One striking indicator in the meatpacking industry has been infection rates 
for rural counties with meatpacking plant outbreaks.  The average infection 
rate in late May in these counties was almost 1,100 per 100,000 — more than 
five times the average rate of rural counties without meatpacking plants.50  
In late May 2020, six of the ten U.S. counties with the highest infection rates 
were home to meatpacking plants suffering from outbreaks — rates range 
from 4,190 to 7,865 per 100,000.51  As a point of comparison, the infection 
rate in New York City during that time was 2,512 per 100,000.52 
 
 48. See Nicole Dungca et al., On the Front Lines of the Pandemic, Grocery Workers Are 
in the Dark About Risks, WASH. POST (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/05/24/grocery-workers-coronavirus-ri
sks/ [https://perma.cc/YY3V-6CMB]. 
 49. For meatpackers, see Sky Chadde, Tracking Covid-19’s Impact on Meatpacking 
Workers and Industry, MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, 
https://investigatemidwest.org/2020/04/16/tracking-covid-19s-impact-on-meatpacking-work
ers-and-industry/ [https://perma.cc/BD4M-N2M2] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (reporting at 
least 41,000 positive cases and 214 deaths as of October 30, 2020). For grocery store workers, 
see Abha Bhattarai, Grocery Workers Say Morale Is at an All-Time Low: ‘They Don’t Even 
Treat Us Like Humans Anymore,’ WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/12/grocery-workers-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/4M9G-M576] (reporting, as of August 12, 2020, at least 8,200 positive 
cases and 130 deaths). For healthcare providers, see Cases & Deaths Among Healthcare 
Personnel, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.g
ov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019-ncov%2Fcases-updates%2Fcases-in-us.html#health-care-perso
nnel (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) (reporting at least 201,992 positive cases and 786 deaths as of 
November 2, 2020). For transit workers, see Jose Martinez, NYC Subway Crews Hit Hardest 
by Coronavirus, MTA Numbers Show, CITY (June 1, 2020, 5:05 PM), 
https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/6/1/21277407/nyc-subway-crews-hit-hardest-by-coronavirus-
pandemic-mta-numbers-show [https://perma.cc/L6MV-KE56] (addressing New York City 
alone; updated to August 27, 2020, reporting at least 9,500 positive cases and 127 deaths). 
 50. See Leah Douglas & Tim Marema, When COVID-19 Hits a Rural Meatpacking Plant, 
County Infection Rates Soar to Five Times the Average, FOOD & ENV’T REPORTING NETWORK 
(May 28, 2020), 
https://thefern.org/2020/05/when-covid-19-hits-a-rural-meatpacking-plant-county-infection-
rates-soar-to-five-times-the-average/ [https://perma.cc/HE8Y-5PMJ]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. John Elflein, Rates of Coronavirus (COVID-19) in the United States in the Most 
Impacted Counties as of June 9, 2020, STATISTICA (Aug. 24, 2020), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109053/coronavirus-covid19-cases-rates-us-americans-
most-impacted-counties/ [https://perma.cc/HC2B-W5V8]. 
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II. INADEQUATE PROTECTIONS FOR FRONTLINE ESSENTIAL WORKERS 
Government efforts to protect health and safety during the COVID-19 
outbreak have addressed the general population as well as the workforce.  
Measures aimed at the workforce as a whole fall into preventive, 
ameliorative, and compensatory categories, and these measures have 
enhanced protections available to FE workers as well.  At the same time, the 
patchwork changes in federal and state law have been uneven, inconsistent, 
and seriously inadequate.  Taken as a whole, the fragmented responses are 
unworthy of the “heroes” rhetoric attached to these workers.  FE workers, 
recognizing this irony, have pointed to the inadequate protections 
accompanying their “heroes” label.53 
A. Paid Leave 
The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA)54 creates two new 
kinds of paid leave for employers with fewer than 500 employees, both of 
which terminate December 31, 2020.55  The Act mandates paid family and 
medical leave for employees unable to work because they are caring for their 
children.56  It further requires employers to provide up to 80 hours of 
emergency paid sick leave for a range of reasons related to COVID-19.57  
Both provisions are enforced through existing labor law statutes, including 
private rights of action.58 
 
 53. See, e.g., Karleigh Frisbie Brogan, Calling Me a Hero Only Makes You Feel Better, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 18, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/i-work-grocery-store-dont-call-me-hero/
610147/ [https://perma.cc/8RT9-SQUT]; Hanna Wallis, Nurses Say They Don’t Want to Be 
Called Heroes During the Coronavirus Pandemic, TEEN VOGUE (Apr. 28, 2020), 
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/nurses-dont-want-to-be-called-heroes 
[https://perma.cc/664Q-TAS2]. See generally Bhattarai, supra note 49 (discussing the 
difficult work conditions of FE workers). 
 54. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 1, 134 Stat. 178 
(2020). 
 55. See id. § 3102. 
 56. See id. FFCRA, Division C, amends Title I of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 
providing up to 12 weeks leave, the first two unpaid and thereafter paid at no less than 
two-thirds the employee’s regular pay. See id. 
 57. See id. § 5102(a)–(b). The paid sick leave is in addition to any benefits that employees 
already accrue, including FFCRA’s paid family and medical leave. See id. § 3102. Employers 
are not required to provide either form of leave to employees who are healthcare providers or 
emergency responders. See id. 
 58. Enforcement of the family and medical leave requirements is through existing Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provisions, which authorize private suits against employers 
covered by the FMLA. See id. § 5105(a). Enforcement of paid sick leave protections is 
through the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): an employer who fails to provide this leave is 
considered to have failed to pay minimum wages. See id. 
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Although these new federal mandates furnish important temporary 
protections for millions of workers, their coverage restriction to employers 
with fewer than 500 employees excludes nearly half of the private-sector 
workforce.59  The justification for the large-employer exclusion was that 
most such companies already offer paid sick days and leave, and thus do not 
need the federal tax subsidies contained in FFCRA.  The reality, however, is 
that these employers very often provide either no paid sick leave or fewer 
than ten days; they also generally provide extended family leave only for 
parents with a new child.60 
In addition, DOL has issued guidance that restricts or undermines the 
statutory protections in several meaningful ways.61  Further, while the 
legislation authorized DOL to issue regulations “for good cause” to exempt 
small businesses with fewer than 50 employees in limited circumstances, 
DOL’s temporary rules effectively invite all small businesses to declare 
 
 59. According to the BLS, 47.6% or approximately 59 million individuals worked for 
private-sector employers that employ more than 500 employees in 2019. See Table F: 
Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size Class: 1993/Q1 Through 2019/Q1, 
Not Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB. STAT. [hereinafter Table F], 
https://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/table_f.txt [https://perma.cc/GR2S-GQ98] (last visited Aug. 
31, 2020). 
 60. See Steven Findlay, Congress Left Big Gaps in the Paid Sick Days and Paid Leave 
Provisions of the Coronavirus Emergency Legislation, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200424.223002/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/84AD-3EJR]; see also Michelle Long & Mathew Rae, Gaps in the 
Emergency Paid Sick Leave Law for Health Care Workers, KFF (June 17, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/gaps-in-emergency-paid-sick-leave-la
w-for-health-care-workers/ [https://perma.cc/R44U-GT8E] (discussing exclusion of 
healthcare workers identified supra note 57, as well as exclusion of large private employers). 
 61. These limitations include (i) creating a substantially overbroad application of the 
“healthcare provider” exemption from paid sick and family leave, contrary to the Act’s 
definition; (ii) reducing access to leave for those days when the employer does not assign 
them work, furloughs them, or closes a particular worksite; and (iii) defining leave access at 
full-day increments although the statute refers to “paid sick time,” which allows for 
intermittent leave. See Letter from Sen. Patty Murray & Rep. Rosa DeLauro to Eugene Scalia, 
Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Apr. 1, 2020) (explaining their concerns at length and 
referencing specific provisions in FFCRA and DOL Guidelines). A federal district court 
subsequently voided limitations dealing with the scope of the healthcare provider exemption 
and with reduced access to sick leave when no work is available. See Jonathan Stempel, Judge 
Rejects Trump Restrictions on Coronavirus Sick Leave for Employees, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 
2020, 11:08 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-new-york-lawsuit/judge-rejects-trum
p-restrictions-on-coronavirus-sick-leave-for-employees-idUSKCN24Z1Y6 
[https://perma.cc/6885-3GBR]; see also Chris Lu et al., Why Americans Don’t Know About 
Their Right to Paid Sick Leave, NEWSWEEK (May 4, 2020, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/why-americans-dont-know-about-their-right-paid-sick-leave-op
inion-1501532 [https://perma.cc/K3EP-C8QV] (addressing these problems and also failure to 
publicize availability of the paid leave even though Congress allocated $15 million to DOL 
to do so). 
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themselves exempted, with no requirement for agency review or even 
employer documentation of reasons.62  Given that 34 million employees 
work for small businesses, the effect of this added exemption is to leave 
roughly three-quarters of the private-sector workforce uncovered by the paid 
leave requirements.63  Excluding employers with fewer than 50 employees 
particularly impacts certain occupations; nearly two-thirds of agricultural 
workers, for instance, are hired by these smaller employers.64 
Some state and local governments have come forward to try and fill in the 
sizable gaps regarding paid leave.  A California Executive Order requires 
that paid sick and family leave be provided for food sector workers anywhere 
in the food supply chain, working for companies that employ 500 or more 
nationwide.65  New York, New Jersey, Michigan, and Colorado, among other 
states, have extended paid sick leave and family and medical leave to 
employees not limited to a particular occupation or industry.66  Some of these 
states have targeted protection to workers in small business settings with 
fewer than 50 employees.67  In addition, local governments have 
 
 62. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 5111, 134 Stat. 
178 (2020) (authorizing regulations to exempt small businesses “for good cause”); id. § 
5111(2) (authorizing exemption of employers with fewer than 50 employees “when the 
imposition of [leave] requirements would jeopardize the viability of the business as a going 
concern”); 29 C.F.R. § 826.40(b) (2020) (allowing exemption if eligible employees’ absence 
would cause small business expenses and obligations to exceed business revenue, would pose 
a substantial risk to financial health or operational capacity, or would prevent business from 
operating at minimum capacity. Although small businesses must document and retain records 
justifying denial of leave in connection with unavailability of childcare, no such requirement 
exists for denial of paid leave for other reasons). 
 63. According to BLS, 34 million individuals, or approximately 27.4% of the active 
workforce, worked for employers with fewer than 50 employees in 2019. Table F, supra note 
59. 
 64. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM LABOR 22 (2019), 
https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/x920fw89s/c821h164m/fq97889
43/fmla1119.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7NB-E3RV]. See generally Daniel Costa & Philip 
Martin, Nine in 10 Farmworkers Could Be Covered by the Paid Leave Provisions of the 
Families First Coronavirus Response Act — but Not If Smaller Employers Are Exempted, 




 65. See Cal. Exec. Order No. 51-20 (Apr. 16, 2020). 
 66. See Colorado Health Emergency Leave with Pay (Colorado Help) Rules, COLO. CODE 
REGS. § 1103-10 (2020); New Jersey Earned Sick Leave, 2020 N.J. Laws Ch. 17 (codified as 
amended at N.J. STAT. § C.34:11D-3); New Jersey Expanded Family Leave Law, 2020 N.J. 
Laws Ch. 23 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. § C.34:11B-3); New York Paid Sick Leave 
Law, 2020 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 25, § 8091 (McKinney 2020); Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-36 
(Apr. 3, 2020), [hereinafter Michigan Executive Order]. 
 67. N.Y. Sick Leave Law requires: (i) employers with ten or fewer employees provide 
unpaid quarantine leave, and (ii) employers with fewer than ten employees and net income 
greater than $1 million, or employing between 11 and 99 employees, provide at least five days 
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promulgated their own paid leave ordinances.  In California localities, such 
ordinances vary by the size of employers covered, and some are silent with 
regard to specific aspects, including job restoration, intermittent use of leave, 
employer obligation to post notice, and availability of an enforcement action 
for damages and attorney’s fees.68  These variations at state and local levels 
indicate a broad-based interest in innovative solutions.  At the same time, the 
unevenness in coverage and protections also reflects gaps left by the absence 
of a comprehensive federal approach. 
Related to sick leave, workers’ families and representatives have begun 
filing wrongful death lawsuits in state courts.  Thus far, a number of these 
suits have been on behalf of deceased individuals who worked in meat 
processing and chain store occupations.69  An additional and important 
development in a number of states is the action taken to extend workers’ 
compensation coverage to COVID-19 infections by reversing the usual 
presumption that diseases of ordinary life are not covered.  The most 
common approach is to make COVID-19 infections presumptively 
work-related for healthcare workers and first responders.70  Some states have 
 
of paid quarantine leave, and the remainder unpaid. See N.Y. Sick Leave Law § 1.1(a). N.J. 
Family Leave Law applies to employers with at least 30 employees, N.J. Stat. § 
34:11B-3(f)(4), while N.J. Earned Sick Leave Law applies to all employers, regardless of size. 
See N.J. Stat. § 34:11D-2(a). Michigan Executive Order, supra note 66, at 7(b), mandates that 
employers, including ones with fewer than 50 employees, provide paid medical leave. 
 68. See L.A. COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE CH. 8.200.010 (2020); OAKLAND, CAL., 
OAKLAND MUNICIPAL CODE CH. 5.94 (2020); SAN JOSE, CAL., URGENCY ORDINANCE NO. 
30390 (2020); L.A., Cal., Public Order — Supplemental Paid Sick Leave Due to COVID-19 
(Apr. 7, 2020); S.F., Cal., Public Health Emergency Leave Ordinance Implementation 
Guidance (Apr. 17, 2020). 
 69. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Zuniga v. Safeway Inc., No. RG50063313 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
June 3, 2020); Complaint ¶ 3.1, Lay v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2020 WL 2511326 (N.D. Tex. May 
15, 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-00125-Z); Complaint at 3, Benjamin v. JBS S.A., No. 200500370 
(Phila. Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. May 7, 2020); Complaint § V, Parra v. Quality Sausage Co., No. 
DC-20-06406 (Dall. Cty. Jud. Dist. Ct. May 1, 2020); Complaint at 2, Evans v. Walmart Inc., 
No. 2020L003938 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 6, 2020) (removed to S.D. Ala. on May, 27, 2020); 
see also Harris Meyer, Coronavirus-Related Deaths in Nursing Homes Prompt Lawsuits and 
Questions About Who’s Responsible, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2020, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/coronavirus-related-deaths-in-nursing-homes-
seed-lawsuits-and-questions-about-whos-responsible [https://perma.cc/DJ3P-L6PH] 
(reporting 55 wrongful death lawsuits filed against long-term care facilities as of early 
September). 
 70. See, e.g., S.B. 241, 31st Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2020) (May 18, 2020); N.D. Exec. 
Order No. 2020-12 (Mar. 25, 2020); Press Release, Jay Inslee, Wash. Governor, Inslee 
Announces Workers’ Compensation Coverage to Include Quarantined Health Workers/First 
Responders (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/inslee-announces-workers-compensation-covera
ge-include-quarantined-health-workersfirst [https://perma.cc/3JV2-ECEB]. 
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gone further, extending the presumption of coverage to grocery workers, all 
essential workers, or even all workers.71 
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 
passed in March 2020, was the second major federal law affecting workers.72  
The law’s central feature is an economic stimulus package of unprecedented 
size and scope that includes substantial federal unemployment compensation 
benefits on top of the existing state benefits system.73  The CARES Act 
includes other provisions related to workers’ well-being, such as financial 
support for healthcare industries and tax credits or deferrals for employers.74  
Additional sections of the Act support workers in the heavily unionized air 
carrier industry;75 those sections are examined in Section II.F. 
B. PPE and Social Distancing Requirements 
The FFCRA does not address safety and health protections for employers 
to furnish at individual workplaces.  These protections may be provided ad 
hoc on an individual workplace basis, but employers and industries also are 
in a position to develop and implement workplace infection control plans 
specific to each type of workplace and its level of COVID-19 exposure.  
Hospitals, grocery stores, and meat processing plants carry higher and more 
diverse risks than accounting offices or law firms, warranting different 
approaches to their respective working conditions and environments.  In 
principle, employer plans should cover a range of factors such as exposure 
and risk assessment, the need for PPE and other job condition adjustments, 
 
 71. See H.B. 2455, 101st Leg. (Ill. 2020) (enacted June 5, 2020) (extending to all essential 
workers); Cal. Exec. Order No. 62-20 (May 6, 2020) (extending to all workers otherwise 
covered under workers compensation); Ky. Exec. Order No. 2020-277 (Apr. 9, 2020) 
(extending the presumption to grocery store workers and also postal workers and childcare 
workers). 
 72. Congress enacted a third statute in March to stimulate coronavirus vaccine research 
and development. See Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146 (2020). 
 73. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 
116-136, § 2104(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2020) (adding an additional $600 per week for employees 
receiving unemployment compensation under state law); id. § 2107(b)(2) (providing an 
additional 13 weeks of unemployment compensation benefits than otherwise provided under 
state law); id. § 2102(a)(3)(A) (broadening provision of unemployment benefits to include 
self-employed, contract, and gig economy workers who would not have otherwise qualified 
for the new federal aid as long as they self-certify that they are unemployed or unable to work 
because of listed pandemic-related reasons). 
 74. See § 3211 (providing supplemental appropriations for health centers to aid 
prevention, detection, and treatment of COVID-19); id. § 2302 (allowing employers to defer 
the deposit and payment of their portion of Social Security taxes). This Article does not 
discuss these provisions inasmuch as they do not directly address health and safety 
protections. 
 75. See id. §§ 4111–4116. 
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medical removal and wage protection for infected or exposed workers, 
recording and reporting of infections, training and education of workers, and 
anti-retaliation protection for workers who raise safety and health concerns. 
Relatedly, CDC has issued periodic detailed guidance for employers 
responding to COVID-19, including addressing actions tailored to particular 
industries.76  Overall, CDC has addressed a broad range of protective steps, 
including undertaking a hazard assessment of the workplace, conducting 
daily health checks of workers, encouraging employees to wear cloth face 
coverings in the workplace, implementing policies and practices for social 
distancing in the workplace, and improving the workplace ventilation 
system.77  The logical agency to turn to for implementation of such guidance 
as enforceable requirements is the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) within DOL.  As discussed in the following Section, 
however, OSHA has refused to issue any directive in the form of a 
provisional or emergency safety and health standard.  Instead, the agency has 
offered its own “Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19,” while 
stating at the outset that this guidance “creates no new legal obligations,” 
offers “recommendations [that] are advisory in nature,” and describes a 
voluntary set of actions that employers “[c]an take to reduce workers’ risk 
of exposure.”78 
Facing a lack of federal requirements, a few states again stepped up, often 
beginning when the economy began re-opening after stay-at-home orders.  
In California, the Department of Industrial Relations specifies that 
employers must determine if COVID-19 is a hazard in their workplace as 
 
 76. See, e.g., Meat and Poultry Processing Workers and Employers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 9, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/meat-poultry-proces
sing-workers-employers.html [https://perma.cc/UNY7-8CKW]; What Grocery and Food 
Retail Workers Need to Know About COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/grocery-food-retail-
workers.html [https://perma.cc/F847-9Y34]; What Mail and Parcel Delivery Drivers Need to 
Know About COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/mail-parcel-drivers.h
tml [https://perma.cc/Z4H9-JUWU]; What Nail Salon Employees Need to Know About 
COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/nail-salon-employee
s.html [https://perma.cc/PMY8-F9M2]. 
 77. COVID-19 Critical Infrastructure Sector Response Planning, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/critical-infrastructure-sectors.html 
[https://perma.cc/H8AV-ACZE] (recommending that employers adopt a multi-pronged 
response plan with goals to maintain healthy business operation, reduce transmission, and 
maintain healthy work environment). 
 78. GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19, supra note 43, at 1, 7. 
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part of the state’s mandated Injury and Illness Prevention Program.  If it is a 
workplace hazard, employers are required to implement infection control 
measures, including applicable recommendations from the CDC.79  Other 
states — including Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey at early stages 
and some 35 states by mid-August — mandated the use of masks at all times 
by the public as well as workers inside grocery stores, pharmacies, and other 
retail establishments.80  Several states, including New York, require 
employers to provide PPE to workers at the employers’ expense.81 
Without systemic occupationally tailored requirements for PPE, social 
distancing, and other workplace safety protections, FE workers have, at 
times, acted on their own to try and compel such protections.  Workers in 
hospitals, meat processing plants, warehouse distribution centers, and fast 
food establishments have brought lawsuits seeking injunctions ordering a 
range of protective steps.82  Some court actions have resulted in a measure 
 
 79. Cal/OSHA Interim General Guidelines on Protecting Workers from COVID-19, ST. 
CAL. DEP’T INDUS. RELS. (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dosh/coronavirus/general-industry.html 
[https://perma.cc/AQW5-M6V3]. 
 80. See Mass. Exec. COVID-19 Order No. 31 (May 1, 2020) (requiring that all employers 
and customers wear masks inside grocery stores, pharmacies, retail stores, and when using 
mass public transit); N.J. Exec. Order No. 122 (Apr. 8, 2020) (requiring that workers and 
customers of essential businesses wear face masks); N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.16 (Apr. 12, 
2020) (mandating that all employees in contact with the public wear masks); N.Y. Exec. Order 
No. 202.34 (May 28, 2020) (allowing any business operator or owner to require any individual 
to wear a mask). See generally Allen Kim et al., These Are the States Requiring People to 
Wear Masks When Out in Public, CNN (Aug. 17, 2020, 5:20 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/19/us/states-face-mask-coronavirus-trnd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/KE7L-FRRM]. 
 81. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01 (Apr. 2, 2020) (requiring that critical 
infrastructure employers provide personal protective equipment to workers as available); N.J. 
Exec. Order No. 122 (Apr. 8, 2020) (ordering that businesses provide, at their expense, face 
coverings and gloves for employees when in contact with customers or goods); N.Y. Exec. 
Order No. 202.16 (Apr. 12, 2020) (mandating that employees at all essential businesses be 
provided with and wear face coverings when in direct contact with the public); R.I. Exec. 
Order No. 20-24 (Apr. 14, 2020) (mandating that all businesses provide, at their expense, face 
coverings). 
 82. For hospitals, see N.Y. Nurses Ass’n v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 2020 WL 2097627, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Complaint at 19, Lange v. 24-Hour Med. Staffing Servs. LLC, No. 
30-2020-01140958-CU-OE-CXC (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2020). For meat processing plants, 
see Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 5:30-CV-06063-DGK, 2020 WL 
2145350, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 2020); Complaint ¶ A, Ornelas v. Cent. Valley Meat Co., 
No. 1:20-cv-01017-AWI-SKO (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2020), 2020 WL 4249733, at *33. For 
warehousing operations, see Memorandum of Law of Defendant at 1, Palmer v. Amazon.com, 
No. 1:20-cv-02468-BMC (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2020), 2020 WL 5236964, at *1. For fast food 
restaurants, see generally Complaint, Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 2020-ch-04247 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. May 19, 2020), 2020 WL 2747338, at *16–17; Complaint, Hernandez v. VES 
McDonald’s, No. RG20064825 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2020), 2020 WL 32878054, at *17. 
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of success, while others have fallen short.83  The quest for judicially-imposed 
remedies is likely to expand in the months ahead.  In addition, workers in 
both union84 and non-union85 settings have engaged in forms of self-help, 
staging walkouts to protest the lack of adequate protections.  Unionized 
workers also have negotiated to secure PPE, adequate social distancing, and 
 
 83. In Massey, the court granted partial injunctive relief, finding that the restaurants’ 
training on social distancing and ensuring use of masks was deficient. See Angela Childers, 
McDonald’s Ordered to Train Workers on Social Distancing, BUS. INS. (June 25, 2020), 
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200625/NEWS08/912335302 
[https://perma.cc/JCQ5-P8T8]. In Hernandez, the court granted a preliminary injunction that 
requires defendant to implement and provide adequate training, safe distancing, paid breaks 
every 30 minutes for handwashing, and face masks and gloves. See Robert Iafolla, 
McDonald’s Workers Win Virus Safeguards in ‘Dog Diaper’ Case (Corrected), BLOOMBERG 
L. (July 10, 2020, 4:28 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/mcdonalds-workers-win-virus-safety-ord
er-in-dog-diaper-case [https://perma.cc/R4QJ-W5CD]; see also Court Orders Restaurant 
Company to Allow Worker to Wear Face Covering, CISION (May 7, 2020, 7:09 PM), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/court-orders-restaurant-company-to-allow-wor
ker-to-wear-face-covering-301055430.html [https://perma.cc/94BF-G3ZB]. In N.Y. Nurses 
Ass’n, 2020 WL 2097627, at *3, the court dismissed the lawsuit on grounds the dispute was 
subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. In Rural Cmty. Workers All., 
2020 WL 2145350, at *12, the court dismissed the motion for preliminary injunction, ruling 
that plaintiffs had not demonstrated irreparable harm and dismissed the lawsuit on grounds 
the agencies had primary jurisdiction. 
 84. See, e.g., Chris Brooks, Auto Companies Announce Closure Following Outbreak of 
Wildcat Strikes, LAB. NOTES (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.labornotes.org/blogs/2020/03/auto-companies-announce-closure-following-out
break-wildcat-strikes [https://perma.cc/2VKF-UY7Q]; Royce Jones, ‘I’m Not Afraid of No 
Virus Because I Know My God Got Me’: Port Authority Bus Drivers Protest for Better 
Conditions During Coronavirus Pandemic, CBS PITTSBURGH (Mar. 27, 2020, 5:52 PM), 
https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2020/03/27/port-authority-bus-drivers-protest-for-better-con
ditions/ [https://perma.cc/EU2Y-K8BR]; Michael Paulson, Union Insists Actors Shouldn’t 
Work Till Epidemic Is ʻUnder Control,ʼ N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/theater/actors-equity-theater-reopening-virus.html?sm
id=em-share [https://perma.cc/3UPH-8ZPB]; Jane Slaughter, Detroit Bus Drivers Win 
Protections Against Virus Through Strike, LAB. NOTES (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.labornotes.org/blogs/2020/03/detroit-bus-drivers-win-protections-against-virus-
through-strike [https://perma.cc/2QFT-X625]; Lori Valigra, Bath Iron Works Union Asks for 
Shipyard Closure After Half of Workers Fail to Show, WGME (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://wgme.com/news/coronavirus/bath-iron-works-union-asks-for-shipyard-closure-after-
half-of-workers-fail-to-show [https://perma.cc/U4DZ-TZNF]. 
 85. See, e.g., Josh Dzieza, Amazon Warehouse Workers Walk Out in Rising Tide of 
COVID-19 Protests, VERGE (Mar. 30, 2020, 2:46 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/30/21199942/amazon-warehouse-coronavirus-covid-new
-york-protest-walkout [https://perma.cc/8DGE-LAGG]; Sarah Hammond, ‘This Is Not a 
Playing Matter’: Perdue Plant Employees Walk Out over COVID-19 Concerns, WMAZ 
(Mar. 24, 2020, 9:22 AM), 
https://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/perdue-employees-walk-out-as-coronavirus-co
ncerns-grow/93-7c7bdcbb-f3ec-439b-b541-9070e758b5cb [https://perma.cc/M6J6-A8GH]. 
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other forms of protection, including additional paid sick leave beyond what 
is available under federal statute.86 
This patchwork approach to providing workplace protections has yielded 
some advances, although worker protests also have been met with retaliatory 
discipline.87  Moreover, the absence of an overarching federal presence has 
meant that FE workers must fend for themselves, usually on an 
employer-specific basis, to reduce their extraordinary safety and health risks. 
C. Emergency Standards and Agency Enforcement 
The federal agency charged with enforcing workplace health and safety 
has failed to rise to the occasion.  Under its 1970 originating statute, OSHA 
has authority to issue emergency temporary standards (ETS) to protect 
employees against “grave danger from exposure to substances or agents 
determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards.”88  An 
ETS serves as a proposed permanent standard, subject to an ensuing notice 
and comment procedure and operative for no more than six months.89  
Between 1971 and 1983, OSHA issued nine ETSs, some of which were met 
with resistance from the courts of appeals.90 
Between 2009 and 2017, OSHA developed an extensive approach to 
infectious disease rulemaking.91  Today, the agency could draw on the 
experience of the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health, 
applying its pre-existing enforceable standard protecting nurses and other 
healthcare workers from emerging infectious diseases.92  The House pressed 
 
 86. See infra Section II.F (discussing protections negotiated by United Food & 
Commercial Workers (UFCW), American Postal Workers Union (APWU), Communications 
Workers of America (CWA), and transit worker unions). 
 87. See, e.g., Jay Greene, Amazon Fires Two Tech Workers Who Criticized the Company’s 
Warehouse Workplace Conditions, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2020, 6:59 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/13/amazon-workers-fired/ 
[https://perma.cc/A5LX-RPDU]; Justin Wise, Nurses Union Says Workers Were Suspended 




 88. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1). 
 89. See id. § 655(c)(3). 
 90. See SCOTT SZYMENDERA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46288, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA): EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARDS (ETS) AND 
COVID-19, at 22 tbl.A-1 (2020) (listing ETSs). 
 91. See Letter from Richard Trumka, President, Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. 
Orgs., to Eugene Scalia, Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. 8 (Mar. 6, 2020). 
 92. See Letter from Bonnie Castillo, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Nurses United, to Eugene Scalia, 
Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. & Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant, Occupational 
Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Mar. 4, 2020). 
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OSHA to act through a bill requiring ETS promulgation,93 and the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
sought to compel ETS issuance through a judicial action for extraordinary 
mandamus relief.94  The Republican-controlled Senate stalled the legislative 
effort, and a panel of the D.C. Circuit rejected the lawsuit.95 
In refusing to issue an ETS, OSHA has relied on CDC guidelines without 
making them mandatory, thereby removing the prospect of systemic 
enforcement for employer noncompliance.  With respect to enforcement, 
OSHA stated it would rely on its General Duty Clause to assure adequate 
protections in individual instances.96  Yet the agency’s enforcement record 
is stunningly inadequate.  Having received more than 6,000 
COVID-19-related complaints as of July 7, it had issued exactly one citation: 
to a Georgia Nursing Home for failing to report employee hospitalizations 
within 24 hours.97  In late September, OSHA even withdrew that citation and 
 
 93. The Health & Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions Act (HEROES 
Act), H.R. 6800, 116th Cong. (as approved by House, May 15, 2020). 
 94. In re AFL-CIO, No. 19-1158, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 95. The Senate has not voted on the HEROES Act, which would require OSHA to adopt 
an emergency standard, “as Majority Leader Mitch McConnell holds out for special legal 
protections for businesses that could otherwise be sued for failing to provide safe workplaces.” 
The Editorial Board, Why Is OSHA AWOL?, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/opinion/coronavirus-osha-work-safety.html 
[https://perma.cc/4K7C-V8QH]. The D.C. Court of Appeals in In re AFL-CIO dismissed the 
motion for a writ of mandamus in a one-paragraph order, finding the agency “reasonably 
determined that an ETS is not necessary at this time.” In re AFL-CIO, No. 20-1158, at 1. 
 96. See 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970) (requiring employers to furnish a place of employment 
that is “free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious 
physical harm to . . . employees”). DOL Secretary, Eugene Scalia, defended OSHA’s 
response to the pandemic and invoked the general duty clause to cite employers, stating that, 
the general duty clause is “applicable, and we’ll use it as appropriate.” Bruce Rolfsen, OSHA 




 97. See Jane Mayer, How Trump Is Helping Tycoons Exploit the Pandemic, NEW YORKER 
(July 13, 2020), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/07/20/how-trump-is-helping-tycoons-exploit-th
e-pandemic [https://perma.cc/J5FY-Q2UH]; Bruce Rolfsen, First Virus-Related OSHA 
Citation Goes to Georgia Nursing Home, BLOOMBERG L. (May 29, 2020, 4:24 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/safety/first-virus-related-osha-citation-goes-to-georgia-nurs
ing-home?context=search&index=3 [https://perma.cc/2ZSB-KPHN]; The Editorial Board, 
supra note 95. For one example of workers’ frustration with OSHA, see generally Complaint, 
Jane Does v. Scalia, No. 1:02-at-06000-UN (M.D. Pa. July 22, 2020) (alleging that employer 
did not provide adequate PPE or social distancing on the line, or inform workers of those who 
were sick, and also incentivized sick workers to come to work; that plaintiff repeatedly 
contacted OSHA with complaints and demands for action, including filing an imminent 
danger complaint; and that OSHA never visited the plant, but responded by phone stating that 
it will not treat any complaint regarding COVID-19 as an imminent danger complaint). 
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accompanying fine, while making it easier for employers not to report their 
workers’ COVID-19-related hospitalizations and deaths.98  It is hard to 
overstate the extent of this abdication during the first six months of the 
pandemic by the very federal agency charged with protecting the health and 
safety of workers. 
While OSHA issued a handful of subsequent citations in early September 
— to two meatpacking plants and several healthcare facilities — for failure 
to protect workers from the coronavirus,99 the limited nature of these 
citations, the de minimis remedies, and the belated timing are all 
problematic.  To take one example, the agency cited Smithfield Foods under 
the General Duty Clause for failing to provide a safe workplace at its South 
Dakota plant, where nearly 1,300 workers contracted the virus starting in 
mid to late March, over 40 were hospitalized, and four have died.100  The 
 
 98. See Bruce Rolfsen, OSHA Overhauls Guidance for Reporting Virus Hospitalizations 
(1), BLOOMBERG L.: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (Oct. 1, 2020, 5:01 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/safety/osha-again-revises-guidance-for-reporting-virus-hos
pitalizations [https://perma.cc/DHA4-SW2Y]. Employers must now report employee 
hospitalization due to COVID-19 within 24 hours of learning both that the employee had been 
hospitalized and that the reason for hospitalization was a work-related case of COVID-19. In 
reversing its previous requirement that employers report hospitalizations within 24 hours of 
when the employee was diagnosed as having the virus, OSHA made it easier for employers 
to avoid reporting based on their asserted lack of knowledge that work-related exposure was 
a cause. See Sheila Mulrooney Eldred, Healthcare Workers Implore OSHA for More 
Oversight on COVID-19 Safety, MEDSCAPE (Oct. 23, 2020), 
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/939726 [https://perma.cc/PWG3-752C]. 
 99. See Archive of U.S. Dep’t of Labor Press Releases, DEP’T LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases?agency=All&state=All&topic=All&year=all&page
=0 [https://perma.cc/YA6R-9TAK] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020) (listing DOL press releases on 
September 10–11, 2020, that report OSHA citations against three healthcare facilities in New 
Jersey and Louisiana for violating regulations on PPE and respirators, and two meatpacking 
plants in Colorado and South Dakota for General Duty Clause violations; fines assessed range 
from $9,639 to $28,070 for the violations). As of mid-October, OSHA issued more citations 
to healthcare facilities and nursing homes, principally for violation of regulations on providing 
personal protective equipment including particularly establishing and implementing 
respiratory protections. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132, 1910.134. The average assessed fine is 
$14,378 per violation. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health 
Admin., U.S. Department of Labor’s OSHA Announces $1,222,156 in Coronavirus 
Violations (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/10162020 
[https://perma.cc/YJL4-T639] (OSHA announcement of $1,222,156 in coronavirus violations 
for 85 establishments). 
 100. See Citation and Notification of Penalty from Sheila Stanley, Area Dir., Occupational 
Safety & Health Admin., to Smithfield Packaged Meats Corp. 6 (Sept. 8, 2020) [hereinafter 
Smithfield Citation] (copy on file with author); Jacob Bunge, U.S. Regulators Fine Pork Giant 
Smithfield over Covid-19 Outbreak, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2020, 6:18 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-regulators-fine-pork-giant-smithfield-over-covid-19-outbr
eak-11599776324 [https://perma.cc/8EJA-4E83]; Jeremy Fugleberg, OSHA Fines Smithfield 
Foods $13,494 for Not Protecting South Dakota Workers from COVID-19, Faces Backlash 
from Company and Workers, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Sept. 10, 2020, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/newsmd/coronavirus/6655554-OSHA-fines-Smithfield
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agency issued a citation for a single serious violation, almost six months after 
the onset of this massive number of infections, and nearly five months after 
the plant had closed for an extended period at the urging of state and local 
officials.101 
The proper unit of prosecution under the General Duty Clause is a 
violative hazardous condition rather than each individual employee’s 
exposure to the violative condition.102  That said, the single Smithfield 
citation identified multiple failures to mitigate exposures to the COVID-19 
virus,103 and these failures likely would have justified a series of citations 
addressing distinct operations or venues within the company’s eight-story 
facility employing 3,700 workers.104  Further, the Smithfield citation does 
not discuss the lack of training for the largely immigrant workforce regarding 
how to practice social distancing on fast-moving production lines, how to 
use face masks or shields, or how to prepare for and understand any testing 
procedures to be administered.105  Failure to provide training as required 
under a workplace safety standard has been cited as separate violations on a 




 101. See Bunge, supra note 100; Fugleberg, supra note 100. 
 102. See Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192, 1196–97 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 103. See Smithfield Citation, supra note 100, at 6–7 (discussing eight distinct measures of 
proactive social distancing related to different areas in the plant, mandatory employee use of 
protective measures, and required employee screenings accompanied by written explanations 
in different languages). 
 104. Large meatpacking plants typically involve operations related to immobilizing, 
killing, deboning, chilling, and packaging. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, AIR EMISSIONS 
FACTORS AND QUANTIFICATION, MEAT PACKING PLANTS ch. 9.5.1 (1997), 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/ch09/final/c9s05-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EVQ-B8NP] 
(including a generic process flow diagram and description for meatpacking operations). For 
plant size and worker population at Smithfield, see Jessica Lussenhop, Coronavirus at 
Smithfield Pork Plant: The Untold Story of America’s Biggest Outbreak, BBC NEWS (Apr. 
17, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52311877 
[https://perma.cc/DB3D-JB9P]. 
 105. See Smithfield Citation, supra note 100, at 6–8 (discussing various means of hazard 
abatement without addressing the need for employee training in these areas). The workforce 
at Smithfield consists largely of immigrants and refugees from, inter alia, Myanmar, Ethiopia, 
Nepal, Congo, and El Salvador. The workers speak 80 different languages. See Lussenhop, 
supra note 104. 
 106. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 602 F.3d 
464, 466–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding a standard specifying that “each failure to train an 
employee may be considered a separate violation” and distinguishing Reich v. Arcadian 
Corp., 110 F.3d 1192 (5th Cir. 1997), which involved the General Duty Clause and not 
standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor). The three citations at healthcare facilities, 
referenced supra note 99, are for failure to provide employees with respirators, failure to 
implement a respiratory protections program, and failure to provide appropriate PPE. See 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., U.S. Department of Labor Cites Hackensack Meridian 
Health in North Bergen, New Jersey, for Failing to Protect Employees from Coronavirus 
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$14,000 for a single “serious” violation, OSHA could have better fulfilled 
its responsibility by charging the company with multiple General Duty 
Clause violations across distinct plant operations, and perhaps also 
per-employee violations for lack of training — leading to assessed fines 
more commensurate with the catastrophic nature of the problems at this 
plant.107 
Finally, even a single General Duty Clause citation issued in March or 
early April would have sent a message not only to Smithfield, but to other 
meatpacking plants around the country.  Yet despite media coverage and 
worker complaints at the time reporting extensive virus outbreaks in these 
plants, which were operating without social distancing and PPE protections, 
OSHA declared the plants posed no imminent danger to workers, and the 
agency declined to perform on-site inspections at any meatpacking plant 
until the middle of May.108  The agency then waited until its six month statute 
of limitations was about to lapse from the March worker complaints before 
issuing a single citation to Smithfield.109  The agency’s course of conduct 
 
(Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osha/osha20200911-0 
[https://perma.cc/58H8-2AU7]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., U.S. Department of Labor 
Cites New Jersey Hospital for Failing to Protect Workers from the Coronavirus (Sept. 11, 
2020), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osha/osha20200911-2 
[https://perma.cc/3BW6-RMYH]. Assuming multiple employees were endangered by each 
violation, the violations could have been cited per employee rather than on a facility-wide 
basis. 
 107. The maximum penalty for each serious violation of the Act is $13,494. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 666(b); see also Civil Money Penalty Inflation Adjustments, DEP’T LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/resources/penalties [https://perma.cc/2D22-PM54] (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2020) (although the statute states the penalty is up to $7,000 per serious 
violation, the fine is $13,494 accounting for inflation). Thus, pursuing citations for five or six 
distinct violations of the General Duty Clause might have resulted in penalties between 
$65,000 and $80,000. Pursuing citations for serious violations in failing to train scores, if not 
hundreds, of employees might have resulted in penalties closer to $1 million. All of this 
assumes the violations at Smithfield, which allegedly persisted for weeks, were never more 
than serious. If the agency had assessed any of the violations as willful or repeat rather than 
just serious, OSHA penalties could have been as high as $134,937 for each violation. See id. 
 108. See Noam Scheiber, OSHA Criticized for Lax Regulation of Meatpacking in 
Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/business/economy/osha-coronavirus-meat.html 
[https://perma.cc/5UCT-A4MZ]. 
 109. See Kimberly Kindy, More Than 200 Meat Plant Workers in the U.S. Have Died of 




3Ahomepage%2Fstory-ans [https://perma.cc/J5PK-9G7V] (citing to the widespread media 
reports in March and April, and OSHA’s response on timing that the agency “met legal 
mandates because it has ‘a six month statute of limitations to complete any investigation and 
issue a citation’”). 
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leaves considerable doubt about its commitment to protecting essential 
workers, most at risk for COVID-19, in suitably immediate terms.110 
Once again, some states have attempted to fill the substantial federal gap 
in regulation and enforcement.  As noted earlier, California has acted to make 
the CDC Guidelines mandatory.111  And in July 2020, Virginia became the 
first state to issue an ETS addressing COVID-19 infectious disease 
prevention.112  The state took action through its 14-member health and safety 
board after thousands of complaints filed since March and large-scale 
outbreaks at two poultry-processing plants.113  The governor’s office added 
that it was responding to OSHA’s prolonged lack of enforcement regarding 
COVID-19.114 
The Virginia standard sets forth requirements for all employers, 
encompassing the private and state and local public sectors.  These 
requirements include conducting workplace assessments focused on 
COVID-19 exposure risks; devising and implementing requirements for 
social distancing on the job and during breaks; providing access to sufficient 
handwashing and related sanitation and disinfectant facilities; ensuring that 
employees can see their COVID-19-related exposure and medical records; 
developing test-based or symptom-based strategies to enable infected 
employees to return to work; and prohibiting discrimination against any 
employees for exercising rights under the standard, wearing their own PPE 
if not provided by the employer, or raising a reasonable concern about 
infection control at the workplace.115 
The ETS includes an added set of detailed requirements involving 
engineering controls and administrative and work practice controls for 
 
 110. See id. (reporting strong concerns expressed by numerous workers’ representatives, 
citing the agency’s rebuff to their requests for meetings in March and April, and criticizing 
the de minimis nature of citation and fines as effectively an incentive for plants to continue 
hazardous operations). 
 111. Cal/OSHA Interim General Guidelines on Protecting Workers from COVID-19, supra 
note 79 (Title 8 § 3203 requires employers to establish an Injury and Illness Prevention 
Program (IIPP), and IIPP must be adopted to prevent COVID-19). 
 112. VA. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS., VAC25-220, EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARD 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE PREVENTION: SARS-COV-2 VIRUS THAT CAUSES COVID-19, at 16 
(2020) [hereinafter VA. ETS], 
https://www.doli.virginia.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RIS-filed-RTD-Final-ETS-7.24.
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLM5-VRXE] (as adopted by the Safety and Health Codes Board, 
July 15, 2020). 
 113. See Eli Rosenberg, Virginia Adopts Nation’s First Coronavirus Workplace Safety 
Rules After Labor Groups Decry Federal Inaction, WASH. POST (July 15, 2020, 4:48 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/15/coronavirus-workplace-regulation-sa
fety-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/L9VG-JYZJ]. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See VA. ETS, supra note 112, at 14–20, 34. The Standard’s coverage of private and 
public employers is set forth in VA. ETS § 10(C). See id. at 2. 
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employers, and provision of PPE and training on hazard recognition and 
prevention for employees.  These additional requirements are linked to 
hazards or job tasks classified as very high or high exposure risk, with a 
parallel set of engineering, administrative, PPE, and training requirements 
for hazards or job tasks classified as medium exposure risk.116  The 
definitions section of the ETS identifies occupations within these categories.  
High-exposure jobs in the context of COVID-19 include healthcare delivery 
and support services, first-responder services, and medical transport 
services.117  Medium exposure jobs may include, but are not limited to, 
employees working in poultry, meat, and seafood processing; agriculture and 
hand labor; grocery stores, convenience stores, and food banks; drug stores 
and pharmacies; and correctional facilities.118  Employers who violate the 
standard may be fined up to $13,000; willful and repeat violators face 
penalties of up to $130,000.119 
The Virginia ETS represents an important step forward given the absence 
of leadership from the federal government.  Nonetheless, Virginia is a truly 
exceptional instance; only one other state has indicated an interest in such an 
initiative,120 and with OSHA’s refusal to act, there remains a huge gap in the 
ability to require and enforce meaningful protections. 
D. Hazard Pay 
FE workers who are healthcare providers; healthcare support workers; and 
first responders, such as police and firefighters, face especially high risks of 
exposure to COVID-19 on a persistent and hazardous basis.  As noted earlier, 
FE workers employed at grocery, convenience, or drug stores; building 
cleaning services; and childcare and social services are likely to earn low 
incomes and experience severe financial straits as they interact with 
customers, clients, and each other in confined spaces.121  In these 
 
 116. See id. at 22–26, 32. 
 117. See id. at 8–9. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See Alex Gangitano, Virginia Becomes First State to Issue Work Safety Standards for 
Coronavirus, HILL (July 15, 2020, 4:43 PM), 
https://thehill.com/news-by-subject/labor/507531-virginia-becomes-first-state-to-issue-stand
ard-for-worker-protections [https://perma.cc/V86L-B6EG]; Rosenberg, supra note 113. 
 120. Oregon announced its intention to promulgate an ETS on COVID-19 and airborne 
infectious disease by September 2020, to be effective until early 2021, and then replaced by 
a permanent standard. The state has revised its timeline, projecting an ETS in October 
followed by a proposed permanent standard with a public comment period lasting until March 
15, 2021. See Potential Oregon OSHA Rulemaking Timeline: COVID-19/Infectious Diseases, 
OR. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH (Oct. 5, 2020), 
https://osha.oregon.gov/rules/advisory/infectiousdisease/Documents/Infectious-Disease-Pub
lic-Timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WWD-28ZK]. 
 121. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances, FE workers have argued that in providing critical services for 
the country, and risking their personal and family health to do so, the market 
and government should recognize and compensate for their sacrifice. 
A few large companies such as Amazon, Kroger, and Target initiated 
voluntary hazard pay policies in the first weeks of the pandemic.  But they 
discontinued the pay increases by the end of May, although some later added 
extensions for employees working through June or July.122  Those hazard 
pay premiums compensated workers with no real choice but to come to work 
at a time when the rest of the country was shut down.  While many jobs have 
returned, the health risks of being a meatpacking worker, grocery store 
cashier, or home healthcare provider remain high.  Given that millions are 
out of work for the foreseeable future, lower-paid FE workers have little 
choice but to continue without a hazard pay premium, especially because 
most employees who decide to quit are not eligible for unemployment 
benefits.123  As one economist explained, “[i]f you’re an essential worker, 
there’s no other job than the job you currently have . . . [you’re] basically 
forced labor.”124  Unions have succeeded in negotiating hazard pay for FE 
workers at specific plant locations and in a handful of company-wide 
collective bargaining agreements,125 but such agreements are limited to 
settings where unions have sufficient bargaining strength to prevail in the 
current exigent circumstances. 
Legislative proposals on hazard pay for private-sector FE workers have 
not been approved by Congress and have not fared especially well in state 
legislatures.126  Some states and local governments have enacted short-term 
 
 122. See Anders Melin & Ben Steverman, Essential Workers Are Losing Their ‘Hazard 
Pay’ Even as the Pandemic Rages On, TIME (May 14, 2020, 8:17 AM), 
https://time.com/5836736/essential-workers-hazard-pay/ [https://perma.cc/FN5B-LZ9V]; 
Michael Williams, Which Chains Are Still Paying Workers a Pandemic Premium?, TIMES 
UNION (July 9, 2020, 5:28 PM), 
https://www.timesunion.com/business/article/Which-chains-are-still-paying-their-employees
-15397586.php [https://perma.cc/R8ZV-4FPV]. 
 123. Jack Healy, Workers Fearful of the Coronavirus Are Getting Fired and Losing Their 
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/virus-unemployment-fired.html 
[https://perma.cc/H46A-548R]. 
 124. Melin & Steverman, supra note 122 (quoting Columbia University economics 
professor Suresh Naidu). 
 125. See infra Section II.F (discussing agreements reached with large supermarket chains, 
certain meatpacking plants, and a major telecommunications company). 
 126. See The Health & Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions Act, H.R. 
6800, 116th Cong. (as approved by House, May 15, 2020). The HEROES Act, passed by the 
House in May but never taken up by the Senate, provides for hazard pay to a range of 
public-facing workers in essential industries, in the form of a $13 hourly pay premium (up to 
$10,000) from the start of the pandemic until 60 days after the last day of the public health 
emergency. See Fact Sheet: Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions 
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hazard pay or hazard stipends for identified public-sector employees, often 
linked to negotiated arrangements with unions representing those workers.  
The amounts involved range from relatively modest to quite substantial.  
Examples at the state level include hazard pay for correctional workers in 
Maine, Ohio, and Michigan; police and other first responders in New 
Hampshire and Washington DC; and certain healthcare workers in 
Massachusetts and Maine.127  Local governments have enacted similar 
temporary measures, including in regions of the country where unions do not 
represent public-sector workers.128 
 
Act (HEROES Act - H.R. 6800), INT’L BROTHERHOOD TEAMSTERS (June 2020), 
https://teamster.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/HEROES-Act-fact-sheet-revised.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KT75-M64X]. In Wyoming, the legislature rejected, without any 
discussion, a proposed hazard pay bill for employees at risk of contracting COVID-19. See 
Nick Reynolds & Morgan Hughes, With No Discussion, Legislature Rejects Hazard Pay for 
State Employees, CASPER STAR TRIB. (June 21, 2020), 
https://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/with-no-discussion-legislature-rej
ects-hazard-pay-for-state-employees/article_ee3079ae-43d8-547d-a8a3-6010dfe7a752.html 
[https://perma.cc/GY5L-9JFT]. Louisiana has enacted a law providing one-time hazard pay 
checks of $250 for workers who certify they worked 200 front-line hours between March 22 
and May 14. The limited funding is available first-come first-served to law enforcement and 
healthcare personnel, but also to some private-sector FE workers, such as grocery store and 
mortuary employees. See Ashley White, How Louisiana Frontline Workers Can Apply for the 
$250 Coronavirus ‘Hazard Pay,’ LAFAYETTE DAILY ADVERTISER (Aug. 5, 2020, 6:56 PM), 
https://www.theadvertiser.com/story/news/2020/07/14/how-apply-louisiana-hazard-pay-fron
t-line-workers-coronavirus/5428664002/ [https://perma.cc/2W4T-CEU9]. 
 127. On the modest side are D.C.’s addition of $14 per diem for all employees required to 
come to work, continuing as long as the District can afford it, and Maine’s temporary increase 
of $3 to $5 per hour for workers in state mental health and correctional facilities. See Abigail 
Constantino, DC Authorizes Hazard Pay for Workers Who Must Physically Report to Work, 
WTOP (Apr. 14, 2020, 11:54 PM), 
https://wtop.com/dc/2020/04/dc-authorizes-extra-pay-for-workers-who-must-physically-rep
ort-to-work/ [https://perma.cc/DE58-ZNVK]; Maine Governor to Provide Hazard Pay to 
State Corrections and Mental Health Workers, AFSCME COUNCIL 93 (Apr. 5, 2020), 
http://www.afscme93.org/2020/04/05/blogpost/maine-governor-to-provide-hazard-pay-to-st
ate-corrections-and-mental-health-workers/?fbclid=IwAR030Nas0FhJ4tAoi18xqhkwLCUO
omo1YGpveaYPi2rMjEhQ_dLExrWA8Q0 [https://perma.cc/9V23-ZE95]. More substantial 
provisions are New Hampshire’s addition of $300 per week for full-time and $150 per week 
for part-time employees working as police officers, firefighters, EMTs, corrections officers, 
and other first responders, and Michigan’s $750 premium per biweekly pay period for 
corrections officers. See James David Dickson, Mich. COs Get Hazard Pay, Dispute Use of 
Sick Time for Quarantines, CORRECTIONS1 (Apr. 12, 2020), 
https://www.corrections1.com/coronavirus-covid-19/articles/mich-cos-get-hazard-pay-dispu
te-use-of-sick-time-for-quarantines-cNVnQ6TC85ZJ2ott/ [https://perma.cc/SM2U-5LPY]; 
Laura French, Local Governments Providing Hazard Pay, Stipends for First Responders, 




 128. For example, Forsyth County in Georgia approved hazard pay for employees at risk 
of exposure, including an additional $500 monthly payment for employees in contact with the 
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These successful efforts reflect recognition from elected representatives 
that public-sector FE workers deserve special compensation for the health 
risks they bear.  Still, the hazard payments expire within a relatively short 
time frame,129 although the heightened risks associated with their FE 
positions will continue for months, if not years, to come.  And for private-
sector FE workers, who are lower-paid and less likely to be represented by 
unions, there has been no hazard pay beyond what a few large employers 
granted and then withdrew in the initial weeks and months of the pandemic, 
or what has been negotiated in a handful of union settings. 
E. Whistleblower Protections and Rights to Refuse Unsafe Work 
Absent regulatory standards or requirements in the face of COVID-19, 
some protections are available for FE workers seeking to avoid extraordinary 
risks to their health.  Perhaps most directly relevant is OSHA’s 
whistleblower provision, protecting employees against discharge or 
discrimination for exercising their rights under the Act.130  Yet of 1,744 
COVID-19-related retaliation complaints filed by workers from the start of 
the pandemic through mid-August, OSHA docketed just one in five for any 
investigation and resolved only 2% (35 of 1,744) in this period covering 
more than five months — it is not known whether those were resolved in a 
manner that benefited the workers.131 
 
public and $250 monthly payment for employees who cannot socially distance or must enter 
private residences. See Kelly Whitmire, Forsyth County Commits to COVID-19 Hazard Pay 
for Employees, FORSYTH CNTY. NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020, 1:23 PM), 
https://www.forsythnews.com/news/government/forsyth-county-commits-covid-19-hazard-p
ay-employees/ [https://perma.cc/49CV-5ABH]. Boaz City Council in Alabama enacted 
hazard pay in the amount of $200 a month for first responders who come into contact with 
others while working. See Stefante Randall, Boaz First Responders Receive Hazard Pay Amid 
COVID-19 Pandemic, WAFF48 (Apr. 29, 2020, 11:37 PM), 
https://www.waff.com/2020/04/29/boaz-first-responders-receive-hazard-pay-amid-covid-pa
ndemic/ [https://perma.cc/F459-5KX7]. 
 129. Michigan hazard pay provisions expired when the governor lifted the stay-at-home 
order, while the New Hampshire pay was set to expire at the end of June 2020. See Kevin 




[https://perma.cc/B2NM-XLZ7]. The provisions enacted by Boaz County Council last until 
all employees return to working normal hours, while the Forsyth Country premium expired 
after six pay periods. See Whitmire, supra note 128; Kerry Yencer, Boaz Council OK Hazard 
Pay for Police and Fire Employees, GADSDEN TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020, 4:19 PM), 
https://www.gadsdentimes.com/news/20200414/boaz-council-ok-hazard-pay-for-police-and
-fire-employees [https://perma.cc/8SHM-LMQD]. 
 130. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c). 
 131. See Deborah Berkowitz & Shayla Thompson, OSHA Must Protect COVID 
Whistleblowers Who File Retaliation Complaints, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Oct.8, 2020), 
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Private-sector employees who report safety and health violations or 
dangers may be protected from retaliation under other whistleblower statutes 
enacted at both federal and state levels.  A wide range of federal laws 
includes anti-retaliation provisions, although these provisions focus on 
employee participation in investigations or enforcement proceedings rather 
than specifically referencing safety or health issues.132 
The Supreme Court has cast serious doubt on the extent to which these 
laws protect undocumented workers — a notable segment of the FE 
population — when they claim retaliation for reporting workplace 
violations.133  A potential alternative source of support for undocumented 
workers is the U-Visa, which grants non-immigrant status (including work 
authorization) to immigrants who have assisted in specific law enforcement 
matters.134  However, while some workplace-related crimes qualify for 
U-Visa certification, DOL has limited its certification authority to wage and 
hour violations, thus excluding workers who provide assistance in 
investigating or prosecuting safety and health violations.135 
State laws offer safeguards to whistleblowers who are FE workers, but the 
safeguards rely on varying legal standards that highlight the absence of a 
uniform federal approach.  A number of states specify that private- or public-
sector employees must demonstrate an actual violation of safety and health 
law by their employer in order to be protected from retaliation.136  These 
 
https://www.nelp.org/publication/osha-failed-protect-whistleblowers-filed-covid-retaliation-
complaints/ [https://perma.cc/9CJF-F4SM]. On the indeterminate nature of the 35 resolved 
complaints, the authors explain that OSHA does not make outcomes public or explain any 
settlements it has reached. See id. 
 132. See, e.g., Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
1855 (protecting workers from retaliation for exercising “with just cause” any right or 
protection under the Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (protecting against retaliation for making 
charges or assisting in enforcement proceedings under Title VII); The federal Whistleblower 
Protection Act explicitly applies when an employee reports information she “reasonably 
believes evidences . . . a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 1213(a)(1)(B). This law, however, covers only federal government employees. 
 133. See Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (denying relief 
to undocumented worker discharged in violation of NLRA). Lower courts are divided as to 
whether undocumented workers are protected under Title VII. Compare Egbuna v. Time-Life 
Librs., Inc., 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (not covered against retaliation claims), 
with Iweala v. Operational Techs. Servs., Inc., 634 F. Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2009) (covered). 
 134. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (setting forth criminal activities for which 
immigrants who provide prosecutorial assistance may be eligible for U-Visa certification). U 
nonimmigrant status has been available pursuant to U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services regulations since 2007. See Rachel Nadas, Justice for Workplace Crimes: An 
Immigration Law Remedy, 19 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 137, 150 (2016). 
 135. See Nadas, supra note 134, at 153–54. 
 136. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102(3) (applied in Graddy v. Wal-Mart Stores E., 
LP., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1226–28 (M.D. Fla. 2017)); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) 
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laws offer no real protection unless the state has imposed safety and health 
requirements linked to COVID-19 exposure on employers.  Other states 
apply a less stringent standard, requiring whistleblowing employees to 
demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that there was a safety or health 
violation.137  And protections for whistleblowers employed at healthcare 
facilities may be somewhat stronger if the workers complain in good faith 
about unsafe working conditions, improper quality of care, or violations of a 
statute or rule.138 
All of these state and federal laws come into play only after an employee 
has been retaliated against — almost invariably by termination.  In order to 
prevail in a retaliation claim, the worker likely must establish that 
termination was due to the specific and objectively supported assertion of a 
danger to public safety or health.  Employees may be reluctant to risk job 
security by reporting on such dangers, especially during a period of 
large-scale unemployment and economic uncertainty.  Such reluctance 
would appear reasonable with respect to COVID-19, given that the CDC and 
OSHA have failed to designate specific workplace practices as mandatory to 
protect against safety and health dangers, and with few exceptions, the states 
have followed the federal government’s purely advisory lead.  Seeking 
protection from OSHA seems especially futile, inasmuch as the DOL Office 
of Inspector General has reported on the agency’s inadequate job of 
processing COVID-19-related and other whistleblower complaints.139  
Finally, anti-retaliation provisions following a termination have provided 
meager protection for low-wage workers such as those serving in most FE 
occupational areas.140 
 
(McKinney 2019) (applied in Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 622 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1002 (App. Div. 
1995)). 
 137. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1102(5)(b), 6310 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
34:19-3(a)(1) (West 2006). For COVID-19-related complaints recently filed under the New 
Jersey whistleblower provision, see Complaint at 7–8, Rossi v. Alberti, CAM-L-001864-20 
(N.J. Super. Ct. June 1, 2020); Complaint ¶¶ 117–38, Leibovitz v. Hope Cmty. Charter Sch. 
Found., CAM-L-001891-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 3, 2020). 
 138. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20180 (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 
43.70.075 (2019). 
 139. See Vin Guerreri, OSHA Whistleblower Claims Jump Amid Virus, Watchdog Says, 
LAW360 (Aug. 18, 2020, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1302387/osha-whistleblower-claims-jump-amid-virus-wat
chdog-says [https://perma.cc/T4TB-8QCA]; see also supra text accompanying note 131 
(discussing 1,744 COVID-19-related retaliation complaints filed with OSHA). 
 140. This is partly because their limited monetary stakes make it difficult for these workers 
to attract interested and workplace-experienced counsel, but also because mandatory 
arbitration provisions result in contests against well-resourced employers who may well be 
repeat players with an arbitrator. See Alexander Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment 
Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 445 
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Apart from post-hoc efforts to respond to retaliatory termination, FE 
workers also may have certain rights to refuse unsafe work.  There are three 
sources for such a right under federal law.  One is a regulation promulgated 
in the early years of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act.  The 
employee must have a reasonable apprehension of “a real danger of death or 
serious injury,” ordinarily have sought but “been unable to obtain[] a 
correction of the dangerous condition” from his employer, and resort to 
normal statutory enforcement channels must be shown to be ineffective “due 
to the urgency of the situation.”141  This OSH Act protection is far more 
limited than a right to walk off the job based on potential unsafe 
conditions.142  FE workers unable to persuade their employers to correct 
serious COVID-19-related exposures may be unwilling to risk being 
suspended or fired on the chance that their refusal will be found objectively 
reasonable many months later.  Their reluctance may be even stronger given 
that they have no private right of action: only the Secretary of Labor is 
authorized to bring a civil action to vindicate refusal to work under the 
regulation.143 
A second possible federal avenue of protection for refusing unsafe work 
is Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  Section 7 gives 
employees a right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or 
protection, including to protect against what they perceive to be working 
conditions endangering their safety and health, without being subject to 
employer reprisal.144  However, if the workers are covered under a collective 
agreement that contains a no-strike clause, this is likely to prohibit a 
concerted refusal to work during the life of the agreement.145  Further, 
employers confronting a collective refusal to work under assertedly unsafe 
 
(2007); Alexander Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 
35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 83–85 (2014). 
 141. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2). The Supreme Court upheld this regulation as consistent 
with the statute in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980). 
 142. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1) (making this point in express terms). 
 143. See id. § 660(c)(2). 
 144. See id. § 157; see, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1962) 
(applying protected right to employees walking off job in non-union setting); see also NLRB 
v. Tamara Foods, Inc., 692 F.2d 1171, 1176 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding as concerted and 
protected activity refusal of non-union employees to work because they believed that 
ammonia fumes posed a danger; subsequent employer discipline violated the NLRA); Matsu 
Corp., 368 N.L.R.B. No.16 (June 28, 2019) (ordering reinstatement with backpay for 
employees who were discharged for concertedly refusing to work an extra shift because of 
health and safety concerns). 
 145. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 247–49, 253–
54 (1970). In addition, unionized employees at healthcare institutions are required to give ten 
days’ notice “before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work.” 29 
U.S.C. § 158(g); see also Minn. Licensed Prac. Nurses Ass’n v. NLRB, 406 F.3d 1020, 1023–
24 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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conditions, especially a refusal that extends over a period of time, are 
permitted to hire permanent replacements for these employees.146 
The third federal source of protection is Section 502 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act.  Section 502 allows unionized workers to avoid 
the aforementioned restrictions of a collectively bargained no-strike clause 
by providing that an individual or collective refusal to work “in good faith 
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work” is not classified as a 
strike.147  In 1999, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held that a 
work stoppage is protected under Section 502 if: (i) “the employees believed 
in good-faith that their working conditions were abnormally dangerous;” (ii) 
“that their belief was a contributing cause of the work stoppage;” (iii) “that 
the employees’ belief is supported by ascertainable, objective evidence;” and 
(iv) “that the perceived danger posed an immediate threat of harm to 
employee health or safety.”148  The key elements of this test — a subjective 
good faith belief, supported by some objective evidence, and the immediacy 
of the threat — seem likely to justify FE workers refusing to participate 
under a range of COVID-19-related workplace conditions.  At the same time, 
the Board’s 1999 legal standard is open to reconsideration in the current 
setting if challenged by businesses seeking a more employer-friendly 
interpretation of Section 502.  Such a challenge seems quite possible in the 
COVID-19 context, given a conservative NLRB, and an arguable tension 
between the 1999 “good faith” test and language in an earlier Supreme Court 
decision suggesting a stricter standard.149 
State law has responded to whether employees may refuse what they 
regard as unsafe work in the COVID-19 setting.150  This response, however, 
has not been directed primarily at the hazards confronting FE workers.  
 
 146. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 (1938) (stating 
that an employer who decides to permanently replace lawful strikers in order to protect and 
continue his business does not engage in an unlawful reprisal). 
 147. 29 U.S.C. § 143. This provision may be asserted on behalf of an individual worker, 
but its greater impact on labor law is when invoked by a group of workers. Because this 
collective refusal to engage in unsafe work is not treated as a strike, the workers may not be 
permanently replaced under Mackay Radio. 
 148. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 603 (1999). Although a court of appeals denied 
enforcement of the Board’s order on other factual grounds, it endorsed the test quoted above, 
largely based on deference to the reasonableness of the agency’s judgment. See TNS, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 391–93 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 149. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 386–87 
(1974) (construing Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143, 
referring at one point to what could be deemed an abnormal-danger-in-fact test, explaining 
the need for “objective evidence that [abnormally dangerous] conditions actually obtain,” but 
then going on to state that the “ascertainable, objective evidence” must simply support the 
union’s good faith “conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists”). 
 150. This is in contrast to the federal law sources on refusing unsafe work, all of which 
predate, by decades, the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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Rather, states re-opening their economies, after months of sheltering at home 
in early 2020, have focused on possible justifications for a returning 
non-essential worker’s refusal to work, in particular, whether that worker is 
disqualified from unemployment benefits for rejecting “suitable” 
employment when offered.  Some states have issued guidance explaining 
that especially vulnerable workers (e.g., those over 65-years-old, 
immune-compromised, or with certain chronic health conditions) have good 
cause to refuse work and employers should seek alternative work options 
such as telework or modified schedules.151  States also have specified that 
even non-high-risk workers may refuse to return without losing 
unemployment benefits if their workplace has “COVID-19-related 
demonstrable, unsafe working conditions.”152  Other states have chosen a 
different emphasis, encouraging employers to report workers who decline to 
return so their unemployment benefits are stopped as soon as possible.153 
One state with a prior statute addressing the right to refuse unsafe work is 
New Jersey.  New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) 
confers a right to “refuse[] to participate in any activity, policy or practice 
which the employee reasonably believes . . . is incompatible with a clear 
mandate of public policy concerning the public health[] [or] safety.”154  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court has broadly interpreted CEPA’s public policy 
mandate in a number of its decisions.155  The presence of CEPA, combined 
with New Jersey’s detailed guidance regarding protection from COVID-19 
health hazards for essential workers as well as others,156 indicates that an FE 
 
 151. See, e.g., FAQs on Essential and Non-essential Workers, CAL. DEP’T INDUS. RELS. 
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Essential-and-Non-essential-Workers.htm 
[https://perma.cc/FT8B-9DPG] (not applicable to individuals who work in essential services). 
 152. Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2020 044, pt. II.K, at 5 (Apr. 26, 2020). 
 153. See Press Release, Ala. Dep’t of Lab., Refusal of Work Can Cause a Disqualification 
in Unemployment Compensation Benefits (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://labor.alabama.gov/news_feed/News_Page.aspx?id=226 
[https://perma.cc/FE8J-BK9Z]. 
 154. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(c)(3) (West 2006); see also Carolyn Dellatore, Blowing the 
Whistle on CEPA: Why New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act Has Gone Too 
Far, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 375, 383–84 (2008) (discussing CEPA enactment in 1986 
intended to codify New Jersey’s broad public policy exception to employment at will). 
 155. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Montville Township Bd. of Educ., 843 A.2d 1091 (N.J. 2004), 
aff’g 808 A.2d 128, 132–33 (N.J. App. Div. 2002) (protecting an experienced and 
safety-trained school custodian based on his reasonable belief that unsanitary bathroom 
conditions and burned-out exit sign were violations of health and safety rules); Mehlman v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000, 1015 (N.J. 1998) (protecting an employee when he relied 
on guidelines that gasoline with more than 5% benzene levels was hazardous to human 
health). See generally Dellatore, supra note 154, at 387–99 (discussing these and other New 
Jersey Supreme Court decisions). 
 156. See, e.g., Prohibited COVID-19 Related Employment Discrimination, 52 NJR 4(2) 
(2020); COVID-19 Related Discrimination, N.J. DEP’T LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., 
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worker’s right to refuse unsafe work related to coronavirus risks may have 
serious traction in that state. 
The New Jersey example is exceptional, inasmuch as CEPA may well be 
the most expansive state law in the country protecting employees from 
termination for refusal to violate a clear mandate of public policy.157  
Workers in other states bringing causes of action linked to violations of 
safety and health laws or regulations face tougher obstacles.  In the end, both 
state and federal claims asserting protection for refusal to engage in unsafe 
work require case-by-case analysis of employer-specific factual 
circumstances and applicable legal standards on behalf of one or more FE 
workers. 
F. The Role of Unions in Bargained-for and Legislated Protections 
Unionized employees constitute a small proportion of the U.S. workforce, 
but they have been able to secure protections in many areas that exceed what 
federal or state law have provided.158  To cite a handful of examples, 
unionized grocery store employees at several national supermarket chains 
have successfully bargained for temporary hazard pay, 14 days paid sick 
leave for COVID-19 cases, permission to wear masks and gloves, and 
measures to protect employees from customers (such as barriers at checkout, 
limits on the number of customers in the store at once, and signage 
encouraging social distancing).159  Unionized postal workers negotiated for 
additional paid sick leave, including for dependent care, and an expansion of 
 
https://www.nj.gov/labor/worker-protections/covid_discrimination.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/MV44-DMAF] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). 
 157. See Dellatore, supra note 154, at 377. Public safety officers recently filed a complaint 
alleging a CEPA violation based on termination for objecting to transporting potentially 
COVID-19-infected students when plaintiffs had no instruction, training, or guidance on how 
to do so. See Complaint and Jury Demand at 6, Coley v. Princeton Univ., No. 
MER-L-001108-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 19, 2020). Other states have acted by Executive 
Order in recent months. See, e.g., Minn. Emergency Exec. Order No. 20-54, ¶ 3 (May 13, 
2020) (explaining the right to refuse work that employees reasonably believe requires work 
in unsafe or unhealthful manner regarding exposure to COVID-19 or other infectious agent). 
 158. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 159. See, e.g., Kroger, UFCW Announce Increased Pay, Benefits for Grocery Workers on 
Front Lines of Coronavirus Outbreak, UFCW (Mar. 31, 2020), 
http://www.ufcw.org/2020/03/31/krogercoronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/XE37-BUR4] 
(discussing UFCW agreement covering 460,000 Kroger workers across the country). For a 
similar agreement with Safeway workers at San Francisco Bay Area stores, see Local 5 
Reaches Agreement with Safeway to Add Protections for Workers During Pandemic Crisis, 
UFCW, 
https://ufcw5.org/2020/03/local-5-reaches-agreement-with-safeway-to-add-protections-for-
workers-pandemic-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/MG3H-XGYZ] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). 
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teleworking policies.160  Unionized meatpacking employees negotiated 
hazard pay for workers at one major employer161 and temperature checks and 
a series of PPE protections for employees at other major company plants.162  
Unionized workers at AT&T bargained for a 20% bonus for all time worked 
during the pandemic.163  And bus drivers in several cities negotiated 
increased protections, including a requirement that passengers use rear doors 
as their entrance.164 
In addition to securing safety and health protections with respect to 
individual employers through collective bargaining, unions representing 
workers in the airline industry lobbied successfully for major industry-wide 
payroll and employment protections as part of the CARES Act.165  Through 
a dedicated subtitle of the Act, the federal government provided $32 billion 
 
 160. For a discussion of APWU agreements, see Eric Katz, USPS Tests New Ways to 
Protect Employees from Coronavirus, GOV’T EXEC. (May 19, 2020), 
https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2020/05/usps-tests-new-ways-protect-employees-coro
navirus/165514/ [https://perma.cc/BC7P-MUL2]. 
 161. For a discussion of UFCW agreement covering 7,000 Cargill workers at plants located 
in three states, see While Some Employers Roll Back “Hero Pay,” New UFCW Agreement 
with Cargill Makes It Permanent, UFCW (June 17, 2020), 
http://www.ufcw.org/2020/06/17/cargillagreement/ [https://perma.cc/U7GJ-X7H7]. 
 162. For a discussion of UFCW agreements covering meatpacking plants in Wisconsin, see 
Press Release, Urb. Milwaukee, UFCW Local 1473 Announces Universal Free Coronavirus 
Testing for Patrick Cudahy Workers (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://urbanmilwaukee.com/pressrelease/ufcw-local-1473-announces-universal-free-corona
virus-testing-for-patrick-cudahy-workers/ [https://perma.cc/NBE9-R98N]. 
 163. See CWA District 9 (@D9action), FACEBOOK (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.facebook.com/D9action/posts/3343562335657879 
[https://perma.cc/S27E-BF2Y]. 
 164. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 84 (discussing union-backed job action by Detroit bus 
drivers); see also BJCTA Responds to Max Bus Drivers on Strike in Birmingham Due to 
COVID-19 Concerns, WVTM13 (Mar. 23, 2020, 5:02 PM), 
https://www.wvtm13.com/article/some-max-drivers-go-on-strike-over-covid-19-concerns/3
1895933# [https://perma.cc/3B5Q-UFAS] (discussing the Birmingham, Alabama, response 
to job action by non-union bus drivers). 
 165. For a discussion of the support provided by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), 
see Michele Haydel Gehrke et al., CARES Act Enacted Just in Time to Give the Airline 
Industry Much Needed Lift, REED SMITH (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://www.employmentlawwatch.com/2020/03/articles/employment-us/cares-act-enacted-j
ust-in-time-to-give-the-airline-industry-much-needed-lift/ [https://perma.cc/Z43F-Y9N5]. 
For support from the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), see Flight Attendants Win 
Relief for Workers, Not Corporations, ASS’N FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.afacwa.org/flight_attendants_win_relief_for_workers_not_corporations 
[https://perma.cc/J8AF-69A8]. For support from the Machinists Union, see Machinists Union 
Wins Critical Provisions for Working People in Coronavirus Relief Bill, INT’L ASS’N 
MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.goiam.org/news/machinists-union-wins-critical-provisions-for-working-people-
in-coronavirus-relief-bill-2/ [https://perma.cc/9FCH-NE3J]. 
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in financial assistance to the airline industry.166  In order to receive federal 
funding, airline carriers could not furlough workers or make pay cuts until 
September 30, 2020, and they are prohibited from repurchasing stock, paying 
dividends, or making any other capital redistributions until September 30, 
2021.167  Besides preserving compensation for airline workers while 
restricting diversion of corporate assets to management or shareholders, 
other provisions place strict limits on compensation increases, termination 
pay, and severance benefits for highly compensated executives and 
contractors.168  Legislative proponents were explicit in recognizing how the 
funding provisions assured strong industry-wide protections for workers as 
a condition to rescuing large corporations.169 
The enacted industry-wide approach preserved the employment status of 
up to two million airline employees.  In this respect, it differs dramatically 
from the basic U.S. pandemic-response model, which has relegated tens of 
millions of employees to unemployment status.  They scramble to collect 
benefits on a state-by-state basis from overburdened unemployment 
insurance (UI) systems while no longer guaranteed the same jobs when 
conditions improve.170 
Intriguingly, many European Union countries have adopted 
employment-preservation approaches similar to Congress’s airline industry 
solution in order to weather the pandemic’s economic fallout.171  State 
funding in those countries has kept a substantial proportion of wages flowing 
to workers even when their activity is reduced or ceases; this has allowed 
employers to retain and eventually welcome back an experienced workforce 
while contributing to a shared sense of solidarity during the crisis.172  And 
 
 166. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 
116-136, Title IV, subtitle B, § 4120, 134 Stat. 281 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 9080). 
 167. See id. § 4114(a)(1)–(4). 
 168. See id. § 4114(a)(1), (3). 
 169. See, e.g., 166 CONG. REC. S2026 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2020) (statement of Sen. 
Schumer); id. at S1926 (statement of Sen. Brown); id. at S2025 (statement of Sen. Cantwell). 
 170. See Peter S. Goodman et al., European Workers Draw Paychecks. American Workers 
Scrounge for Food., N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/business/economy/europe-us-jobless-coronavirus.htm
l [https://perma.cc/5EA3-E452]. 
 171. See id. (discussing how government wage subsidy programs keep furloughed workers 
employed in France, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Britain, and Spain). 
 172. See id.; see also TORSTEN MÜLLER & THORSTEN SCHULTEN, EUR. TRADE UNION INST., 
ENSURING FAIR SHORT-TIME WORK — A EUROPEAN OVERVIEW 1 (2020), 
https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/Covid-19%2BShort-time%2Bwork%2BM%
C3%BCller%2BSchulten%2BPolicy%2BBrief%2B2020.07%281%29.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RQ8Q-RU93]; Carolyn Look, Explaining Kurzarbeit, or Saving Jobs the 
German Way, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2020, 4:50 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/explaining-kurzarbeit-or-saving-jobs-the-german
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while there were some challenges in the implementation of CARES Act 
airline worker protections,173 pushback from unions and legislators had a 
corrective influence.174 
*     *     *    * 
The airlines’ industry-wide initiative for protecting workers’ basic income 
and job rights should serve as a template for a parallel legislative approach 
in the area of safety and health.  Similarly, the importance of collective 
pressure in securing even limited safety and health protections for FE 
workers suggests that legislative change should enhance the role of that 
collective pressure going forward.  FE workers face major ongoing risks as 
they are asked, or required, to serve and protect the country as a whole.  The 
occasional employer-specific successes described in this Part, set against a 
general backdrop of federal inactivity or abdication, indicate that a different 
approach is needed. 
III. PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS 
COVID-19 is likely to be a public health and economic crisis well into the 




 173. A few airlines cut hours for certain groups of workers, incurring the wrath of unions 
and lawmakers at various times. See AFA Letter to Senate Commerce: Involuntary Reduction 
in Hours Side-Steps Congressional Intent for CARES Act, ASS’N FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA 
(May 6, 2020), 
https://www.afacwa.org/letter_senatecommerce_involuntary_reduction_hours_intent_caresa
ct [https://perma.cc/TY2M-Q8VJ]. Thirteen Senators wrote a letter to Delta, demanding a 
reversal of the hours-slashing policy. See Letter from Elizabeth Warren et al., Sen., U.S. 




 174. One airline subsequently walked back its previously announced plan for hours 
reductions in the face of ongoing criticism and a lawsuit filing. For an article on Machinists 
Union lawsuit to prevent cuts, see Lauren Zumbach, Union Files Lawsuit to Halt United’s 
Plan to Reduce 15,000 Airport Workers’ Hours as Coronavirus Cost Cuts Continue, CHI. 
TRIB. (May 6, 2020, 6:40 AM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-chicago-united-airlines-cuts-w
orker-hours-20200501-7qxpmb2sqndtjbzwevszy2kit4-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/X7CM-LW2B]. See also Chris Isidore, New United CEO Says He Doesn’t 
Want to Cut Any Jobs Despite Crisis, CNN (May 20, 2020, 6:43 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/20/business/united-no-job-cuts/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/D869-A99T] (discussing airline CEO’s more recent statement wishing to 
avoid all cuts in hours). 
 175. For an overview of the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2009, with global deaths 
estimated at more than 550,000, see 2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 virus), CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1-pandemic.html 
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One necessary federal response, for which authorizing legislation already 
exists,176 is a federal workplace standard, similar to Virginia’s, that 
prescribes a coherent approach to protection at various levels of exposure.  
Structural components for such a standard should include administrative and 
engineering controls, PPE protections, provision for recording and reporting 
infections, training and education for workers and supervisors, and 
anti-retaliation protections for workers who raise safety and health concerns.  
Beyond the need for a comprehensive federal COVID-19 regulation, two 
types of legislative change should be priorities in order to enhance the rights 
of FE workers in this setting. 
A. An Industry-Wide or Sectoral Approach  
to Safety and Health Protection 
The COVID-19 crisis illustrates how serious risks to employee safety and 
health arise in occupation-wide or industry-wide terms.  Because such 
challenges are shared across firms in distinct occupational sectors, public 
policy responses must prominently include a sector-based framework.  As 
other labor law and labor relations scholars have observed, sectoral 
responses can generate time and cost savings when compared to a 
firm-specific approach, while also amplifying workers’ role in the 
policymaking process.177  The savings derive primarily from overarching 
norms that reduce or remove safety and health compliance costs from 
firm-specific competition.  Amplified worker voice results from a sectoral 
structure that assures an equal or comparable role for labor, engaging with 
 
[https://perma.cc/LM6R-MTSQ]. For a summary of the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, with 
global deaths estimated at over 50 million including 675,000 in the United States, see History 
of 1918 Flu Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-commemoration/1918-pandemic-history.
htm [https://perma.cc/B9G5-QAP6]. 
 176. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(c), discussed supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 177. See, e.g., SHARON BLOCK & BENJAMIN SACHS, HARV. L. SCH. LAB. & WORKLIFE 
PROGRAM, WORKER POWER AND VOICE IN THE PANDEMIC RESPONSE 10 (2020), 
https://assets.website-files.com/5ddc262b91f2a95f326520bd/5ef2396d689c3880ec008db2_
Clean%20Slate_Worker%20Power%20and%20Voice%20in%20the%20Pandemic%20Resp
onse.pdf [https://perma.cc/24X3-MA5L]; Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 
2, 81–89 (2016); Nelson Lichtenstein, It’s Workers Who Should Determine When Their 
Workplace Is Safe, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://prospect.org/labor/its-workers-who-should-determine-when-their-workplace-is-safe/ 
[https://perma.cc/97X8-HJHM]; see also Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening 
Labor Standards Enforcement Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. 
& SOC’Y 552, 559–60 (2010) (proposing to tailor enforcement strategies to particular 
industries and to give unions and worker centers an ongoing role in the regulatory process). 
See generally Nelson Lichtenstein, Sectoral Bargaining: Historical Roots of a 21st Century 
Renewal, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON LABOR AND DEMOCRACY (Angela B. Cornell & 
Mark Barenberg eds., Cambridge Univ. Press) (forthcoming 2021). 
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management and government to reach agreement on the content, and 
enforcement of those norms.178 
i. Sectoral Approach Applicability for Safety and Health 
While appeals to firm efficiency and worker voice are hardly unique to 
the COVID-19 setting, safety and health as a workplace condition is 
distinctly amenable to a sectoral approach.  Safety protections provided to 
benefit workers typically entail affirmative employer obligations — new 
investment in equipment, devices, and structural alterations, along with 
added human resources to install, operate, and monitor the new investments.  
As with improvement or protection for employee wages, individual 
employers are reluctant to absorb the cost associated with these new positive 
obligations on an individual firm basis.179  The airline industry legislation 
 
 178. Legislating a sectoral approach on industry-specific safety and health norms may lead 
to additional support for unionization. See Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177 
(contending that social bargaining at the sectoral level will empower unions to act more 
generally on behalf of workers). But cf. Cesar F. Rosado Marzan, Can Wage Boards Revive 
U.S. Labor? Marshalling Evidence from Puerto Rico, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 131, 133–
34 (2020) (contending that the relationship between sectoral bargaining and union 
membership is uncertain). 
 179. For present purposes, the positive obligations associated with safety and health 
enhancements or higher wages may be contrasted with certain negative obligations imposed 
on employers — such as refraining from discrimination based on race or sex. Employers may 
find it easier to comply with negative obligations, as compliance does not give rise to 
distinctly new types of investment and may also contribute to greater overall efficiencies by 
eliminating classifications that are on their face irrelevant to job performance. See generally 
James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Discrimination 
Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 276, 290, 297–98 (1990) (discussing 
how Title VII expanded the pool of available workers for southern textile plants and helped 
keep the industry initially competitive in the face of foreign competition). At an international 
level, there is evidence that garment factories in several Southeast Asian countries have 
achieved high compliance with norms of refraining from child labor and forced labor, and 
high or moderate compliance with norms of refraining from sex and race discrimination; their 
greatest area of non-compliance is occupational safety and health. See INT’L LABOUR ORG. & 
INT’L FIN. CORP., BETTERFACTORIES CAMBODIA: ANNUAL REPORT 2018 AN INDUSTRY AND 
COMPLIANCE REVIEW 5–6 (2018), 
https://betterwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/BFC-Annual-Report-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JTU4-V2PM]; INT’L LABOUR ORG. & INT’L FIN. CORP., BETTERWORK: 
ANNUAL REPORT 2018 AN INDUSTRY AND COMPLIANCE REVIEW INDONESIA 7–8 (2018), 
https://betterwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/E-FORMAT-BWI-Annual-Report-2018-
english.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH95-9EK3]; INT’L LABOUR ORG. & INT’L FIN. CORP., 
BETTERWORK: ANNUAL REPORT 2019 AN INDUSTRY AND COMPLIANCE REVIEW VIETNAM 4–7 
(2019), 
https://betterwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/BWV_Annual-Report-2019_EN_v4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PH3C-PGAH]. The Better Work Program, launched in 2007, is jointly 
operated by the International Labour Office and the International Finance Corporation; 
established programs exist in Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and five other countries. See 
Better Work, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/better-work/lang—
en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/PMF4-DMW9] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). 
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discussed in Section II.F suggests that a sectoral approach on wages is 
workable.  Even more than wage increases, firm obligations regarding safety 
and health tend to arise on a less predictable basis.  Relatedly, these 
obligations are harder to plan and account for in straightforward monetary 
terms. 
In addition, government monitoring and enforcement for safety and health 
obligations are more challenging and time-consuming than for wage-related 
obligations.  There are over eight million worksites in the United States; at 
OSHA’s annual rate of roughly 32,000 inspections, it would take the agency 
250 years to inspect every workplace.180  Given that government 
bureaucracies lack the personnel to monitor this vast number of workplaces, 
baseline safety and health norms can be successfully generated and 
implemented only with suitable participation from affected employee and 
employer participants.  And sectoral commissions or committees offer a 
mechanism that can be tailored to the nature and scope of the problems 
presented. 
ii. Historical and Contemporary Models 
There is some history in our country of turning to tripartite industrial or 
occupational committees when seeking to improve wage levels.  Professor 
Kate Andrias has examined the role of industry committees in the early years 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).181  Comprised of an equal number 
of representatives of employers and employees in an industry, as well as 
members of the public, these committees successfully raised wages for 
millions of workers between 1938 and 1944.182  The DOL Administrator 
issued wage orders based on industry committee recommendations.  The 
committees — appointed for 70 different industries — met and conducted 
 
 180. For number of workplaces and federal inspectors and inspections, see Commonly 
Used Statistics, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
https://www.osha.gov/data/commonstats [https://perma.cc/H7UC-2TPT] (last visited Sept. 5, 
2020). Twenty-four states administer their own OSH programs wholly or in part rather than 
depending entirely on federal OSHA. See State Plans, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/stateplans [https://perma.cc/JGV6-ZDSJ] 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2020). Assuming a comparable number of annual state inspections to the 
federal level, there is no possibility of covering more than a miniscule proportion of 
workplaces on an annual basis. 
 181. See Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten 
Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616 (2019) [hereinafter Andrias, An 
American Approach]. 
 182. See id. at 678 (discussing coverage of 21 million workers under 70 distinct increases 
implemented between 1938 and 1944). Under the FLSA, the minimum hourly wage rate was 
to be increased from its 1938 level of 25 cents to 40 cents (a 60% increase) as rapidly as 
possible in industries where it was economically feasible. See Dorothy Tuney, Ten Years 
Operations Under Fair Labor Standards Act, 67 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 271, 272 (1948). 
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factfinding inquiries, gathering economic data that reflected an awareness of 
geographic wage variations as well as the impact of foreign competition.183  
Recommendations to the Administrator resulted from compromises between 
business and labor, with public members acting as referees; Andrias 
describes the process as “a mix between collective bargaining and 
administrative decision-making.”184  All 70 committee recommendations 
supported raising the applicable wage rate; in 83% of the cases, a majority 
of employer members concurred in these recommendations.185 
The FLSA industry committees were focused on the review and 
implementation of wage rates.  This has also been true for tripartite 
commissions at the state level; a recent high-profile example involved New 
York’s fast-food wage board,186 and the commissions continue to operate in 
several states.187  But such commissions could be structured to address safety 
and health protections: either by agreeing on approaches to monitor and 
enforce existing emergency or permanent regulations on an industry-specific 
basis, or by recommending for approval by a relevant government 
administrator an additional set of industry-tailored protections.  California’s 
Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) provides a possible model for this 
approach.188 
 
 183. See Andrias, An American Approach, supra note 181, at 672–73. 
 184. Id. at 672. 
 185. See Tuney, supra note 182, at 272. The Administrator approved 64 of the 70 industry 
committee recommendations. See id. The last wage order was implemented more than a year 
before October 1945, when the 40-cent minimum wage was slated to take effect under the 
FLSA. See Andrias, An American Approach, supra note 181, at 678. 
 186. At the direction of Governor Andrew Cuomo, the Acting State Labor Commissioner 
impaneled the New York fast food wage board. See Fast Food Wage Board, N.Y. ST. DEP’T 
LABOR, https://labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/laborstandards/wageboard2015.shtm 
[https://perma.cc/YTC6-VRYE] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). The board’s hearings and 
deliberations led to a substantially increased minimum wage for fast food workers. See 
Mackenzie Baris, Victory! NY Fast Food Wage Board Recommends $15 Minimum Wage, 
JOBS WITH JUST. (July 22, 2015), 
https://www.jwj.org/victory-ny-fast-food-wage-board-recommends-15-minimum-wage 
[https://perma.cc/3AYK-3VTZ]. 
 187. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-6-109(2) (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4.7 
(West 2005); see also AZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-314 (2020) (wages of minors). New York’s 
wage board has not operated since 2016, but existing wage orders remain in effect. See 
Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177, at 84 n.443. 
 188. California is unusual if not unique in having included authorization to address labor 
conditions such as safety and health, not simply wages. See About IWC, ST. CAL. DEP’T INDUS. 
RELS., https://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/aboutIwc.html [https://perma.cc/MBA6-M8EP] (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2020). 
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The IWC was established in 1913 as part of a broader set of progressivist 
labor laws.189  Notwithstanding a primary wage focus, the IWC is authorized 
to address safety and health conditions through its industry-specific wage 
orders.190  From its earliest days, IWC wage orders included regulation of 
workplace safety and health conditions, pursuant to recommendations 
provided by the state Board of Health.191  Currently, there are 17 operative 
IWC wage orders, covering specific industries and occupations that include 
manufacturing, personal services, canning, freezing and preserving, public 
housekeeping, transportation, amusement and recreation, broadcasting, 
motion picture, and agricultural.192  These wage orders typically regulate 
working conditions such as maintenance of uniforms, tools, and equipment; 
meal periods and rest periods; change rooms and resting facilities; provision 
of adequate seating; and suitable temperature controls.193  It is reasonable to 
assume that such wage orders could extend to broader occupational and 
health regulation, if necessary in collaboration with the state OSH Standards 
Board. 
The IWC is tripartite, with two representatives from unions, two from 
employers, and one from the public, all appointed by the governor with 
advice and consent of the state senate.194  If the Commission finds, after 
 
 189. See WELFARE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: 1917–1918, at 293 
(1919) [hereinafter EARLY IWC REPORTS]. 
 190.  
It is the continuing duty of the Industrial Welfare Commission . . . to ascertain the 
wages paid to all employees in this state, to ascertain the hours and conditions of 
labor and employment in the various occupations, trades, and industries in which 
employees are employed in this state, and to investigate the health, safety, and 
welfare of those employees. 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1173 (West 1998) (emphasis added). Section 1173 further provides that 
the IWC must defer to the OSH Standards Board in cases where regulations or policies of the 
two state entities overlap. 
 191. See, e.g., EARLY IWC REPORTS, supra note 189, at 269–70 (recommendations of 
Board of Health to IWC for the fruit and vegetable canning industry on lighting, ventilation, 
toilets, drinking water, and seats); id. at 273–75 (IWC working condition orders on those same 
subjects). 
 192. See 8 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 11000–11170 (1998). 
 193. See id. 
 194. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 70 (West 2020). In 2006, the IWC was not refunded following 
a period of disagreement between the California legislature, which wanted to increase the 
minimum wage, and the IWC, which did not. See Marjorie Fochtman, From the Experts: Will 
the Revival of California’s Industrial Welfare Commission Reduce the Explosion of Wage and 
Hour Litigation for California Employers?, HR DAILY ADVISOR (Mar. 1, 2007), 
https://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2007/03/01/from-the-experts-will-the-revival-of-california-s-i
ndustrial-welfare-commission-reduce-the-explosion-of-wage-and-hour-litigation-for-califor
nia-employers/ [https://perma.cc/KZK9-XQRZ]. See generally STEVEN EGGLESTON, LABOR 
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investigation including at least one public hearing, “that hours or conditions 
of labor may be prejudicial to the health or welfare of employees in any 
occupation, trade, or industry,” it is required to convene an industry-specific 
tripartite wage board.195  That wage board considers the IWC factual 
findings, as well as any other information it deems appropriate, and submits 
recommendations to the Commission;196 the IWC then is authorized to 
prepare its own proposed regulation that must, in turn, include “any 
recommendation of the wage board which received the support of at least 
two-thirds of the [board] members.”197  Following public hearings on the 
proposed regulation, the IWC may issue wage orders with the force of law.198  
The state bureaucracy enforces existing wage orders; there is also provision 
for private enforcement by individual employees.199 
The California IWC may well be the most relevant current prototype for 
a sectoral approach promulgating and enforcing workplace safety and health 
protections.  While other historical and current examples exist, they raise 
different types of challenges that can only be summarized here.  In historical 
terms, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) codes of fair 
competition, operating from 1933–1935, were promulgated on industry-wide 
bases.200  Although the worker-related focus was on wages and hours, some 
codes required an employer to “make reasonable provision for the safety and 
health of his employees at the place and during the hours of their 
 
AND EMPLOYMENT IN CALIFORNIA: A GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND 
PRACTICES ch. 2 § 2-2 (Matthew Bender ed., 2d ed. 2019) (describing continued applicability 
of the 17 operative wage orders). The authorizing legislation remains in place — and the 
Department of Industrial Relations has amended and republished wage orders in effect at that 
time in accordance with the state’s ongoing minimum wage increase schedule — although 
working condition changes are not included in the ongoing adjustments. See CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 1182.13 (West 2007). Application of the existing wage orders, including for non-wage 
conditions in effect as of 2006, remains the subject of litigation. See, e.g., Lazarin v. Superior 
Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1560, 1575–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (invalidating an exemption from 
a specific wage order that had relieved employers from obligation to provide a second meal 
break). 
 195. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1178.5(b) (West 1980). See generally id. § 1178. 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. § 1178.5(c). 
 198. See id. §§ 2699(a), (f)(2). 
 199. Existing wage orders carry civil penalties, to be enforced by the Division of Labor 
Standards Enforcement (DSLE). The DSLE periodically issues Opinion Letters, which are 
given deference in interpreting the wage orders. See Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 105 Cal. 
Rptr.2d 59, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Individual employees may file a civil action against an 
employer to recover penalties of $100 for the first violation and $200 for subsequent 
violations, per employee per pay period. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2699(a), (f)(2) (West 2016). 
 200. See ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN 
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 57 (1966). 
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employment.”201  Apart from issues of unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power to private groups with minimal executive branch control,202 
the codes themselves were not really a tripartite product.  They were 
essentially voluntary business initiatives, drafted with relatively little input 
from labor interests or experienced government bureaucrats, and lacking a 
genuine enforcement mechanism.203 
By contrast, the National War Labor Board (NWLB), created in 1942 and 
charged with resolving labor-management disputes in order to prevent work 
stoppages that might impede the war effort, was truly tripartite in structure 
and operation.204  In connection with that mission, the federal government 
carried out dozens of seizures of private enterprises from 1942–1946.205  The 
Board’s function, however, was primarily adjudicative — to issue directive 
orders determining outcomes in these wartime labor disputes.206  The NWLB 
 
 201. NAT’L RECOVERY ADMIN., CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR THE WHOLESALE COAL 
INDUSTRY 416 (1934). For other codes with similar safety and health provisions, see, e.g., 
NAT’L RECOVERY ADMIN., CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR THE LYE INDUSTRY 225 (1934) 
(“Each employer shall make reasonable provision for the safety and health of his employees 
at the place and during the hours of their employment, and shall list with the Code Authority 
all occupations of a dangerous nature.”); NAT’L RECOVERY ADMIN., CODE OF FAIR 
COMPETITION FOR THE ZINC INDUSTRY 45 (1935) (“Every employer shall provide for the safety 
and health of employees during the hours and at the places of their employment. Standards 
for safety and health shall be submitted by the Code Authority to the Board within three (3) 
months after the effective date of this Code.” ). 
 202. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537, 541–42 
(1935). 
 203. See, e.g., HAWLEY, supra note 200; Rudolph Peritz, Three Visions of Managed 
Competition, 1920–1950, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 273, 279 (1994); Michael L. Wachter, Labor 
Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 599–600 
(2007). Labor did play a larger role in aspects of implementation and enforcement. See COLIN 
GORDON, NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1920–1935, at 194–203 
(1994). 
 204. See Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (Jan. 12, 1942) (establishing the National 
War Labor Board “for the peaceful adjustment of [labor] disputes”; to be composed of 12 
special commissioners appointed by the President; four representative of the public; four 
representative of employees; and four representative of employers; the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman to be designated by the President from members representing the public). 
 205. The War and Navy Departments administered the seizures. While roughly half were 
interventions to end unauthorized strikes by workers that disrupted war production, a 
comparable number were triggered by business leaders’ willingness to disobey federal law. 
See MARK R. WILSON, DESTRUCTIVE CREATION: AMERICAN BUSINESS AND THE WINNING OF 
WORLD WAR II 190–91 (2016). 
 206. See Robert G. Dixon, Tripartism in the National War Labor Board, 2 INDUS. & LAB. 
RELS. REV. 372, 381 (1949); Allan R. Richards, Tripartism and Regional War Labor Boards, 
14 J. POLITICS 72, 77 (1952). Although the NWLB could not go to court to enforce its 
“directive orders,” incentive to comply with an order came from the Board’s ability to refer a 
case to the President, who could seize control over an offending plant or company, as well as 
from the shared commitment to the war effort. See Dixon, supra note 206, at 373–74, 385; 
Richards, supra note 206, at 76. For a vivid example of the presidential seizure authority in 
action (including an iconic photograph), see Nelson Lichtenstein, World War II: When the 
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also operated largely through 12 regional war labor boards (also tripartite).207  
Such a regional structure is not well-suited to the safety- and health-related 
challenges arising in modern occupations or industries. 
A more contemporaneous context for sectoral application of health and 
safety protections is multi-employer nationwide collective bargaining.  The 
National Football League Players Association has, for many years, 
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering all 30 teams.  
The current CBA includes 28 pages detailing players’ rights to safe working 
conditions and comprehensive medical care and treatment.208  Protections 
include levels of working condition assessment and specialized prevention 
and treatment that far exceed what one might anticipate for almost any other 
occupational sector.209  There are CBAs with an aspiring industry-wide 
scope that includes less extensive safety and health protections, as befits their 
less hazardous industries.210  And examples of CBAs that impact portions of 
an industry beyond the immediate signatory employer(s) include pattern 
bargaining in the auto and hotel industries and multi-employer bargaining in 
the construction industry.211  Still, the major challenge to a sectoral collective 
 
Government Protected All Essential Workers, LAB. NOTES (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://labornotes.org/blogs/2020/04/world-war-ii-when-government-protected-all-essential-
workers [https://perma.cc/R5QY-ZTFP] (describing how the head of Montgomery Ward 
refused to comply with a NWLB order; the union then went on strike and President Roosevelt 
seized the company. The photograph is of two soldiers carrying the well-dressed CEO of 
Montgomery Ward out of his headquarters and onto the street). The NWLB also had authority 
to allow increases in wage and salary rates. See Richards, supra note 206, at 76. 
 207. See Dixon, supra note 206, at 381, 389; Richards, supra note 206, at 77. 
 208. See Collective Bargaining Agreement 2020, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS 
ASS’N 214–42 (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL-NFLPA_CB
A_March_5_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVF3-4BNG]. 
 209. See id. (discussing, inter alia, field surface safety and performance; required 
credentials and training for various levels of club medical providers; players’ right to second 
medical opinions and to the surgeon of their choice; strict regulation of blood and urine 
testing; detailed protocols governing diagnosis and treatment of concussions and neck, head, 
spine injuries; and programs for behavioral health, prescription medication, and pain 
management). 
 210. See, e.g., Master Freight Agreement, INT’L BROTHERHOOD TEAMSTERS, 
https://teamster.org/about/teamster-history/master-freight-agreement/ 
[https://perma.cc/C8U8-SYDA] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020); Writers Guild of America, 2017 
Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement, ALL. MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION 
PRODUCERS, INC. ET AL. (2017), 
https://www.wgaeast.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/10/2017_WGA_MBA-FINAL.pd
f [https://perma.cc/B6MU-38XY]. 
 211. In pattern bargaining, a union reaches agreement on a set of terms and conditions with 
one employer that then becomes the pattern for subsequent agreements with other employers 
in the same industry. See generally Lynn Rhinehart & Celine McNicholas, Collective 
Bargaining Beyond the Worksite, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/collective-bargaining-beyond-the-worksite-how-workers-an
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bargaining approach is that with a few exceptions like professional team 
sports, CBAs do not come close to industry-wide coverage.  Moreover, 
industry-wide pattern bargaining is considerably more limited today than it 
was a few decades back.212  This shrinkage is due to a number of factors, 
including that U.S. labor law as enacted and applied over many decades has 
presented serious obstacles to unionization.213 
iii. Legal and Practical Questions 
Sectoral approaches comparable to California’s IWC are attractive, but 
they also present challenges.  This Subsection briefly discusses three issues, 
although more in-depth analysis is appropriate.  One legal issue is whether 
the tripartite structure and operation will overcome concerns raised under the 
nondelegation doctrine.  A federal tripartite commission, appointed by the 
President with advice and consent of the Senate, seems legitimate, assuming 
there is statutory clarity regarding tenure and conditions for removal.214  A 
structure parallel to the IWC would have the Commission retain authority to 
promulgate a sector-specific regulation after receiving recommendations 
from a sectoral board.  An IWC-type standard of delegated authority to 
promulgate this regulation — whether current “conditions of labor may be 
prejudicial to the health or welfare of employees in any occupation, trade, or 
industry”215 — would be tested in light of the Supreme Court’s apparent 
interest in further exploring its “intelligible principle” jurisprudence.216  




 212. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. ROSENBLUM, COPPER CRUCIBLE: HOW THE ARIZONA MINERS’ 
STRIKE OF 1983 RECAST LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN AMERICA 105–07, 218–19 
(1998) (describing the breakdown of pattern bargaining in the copper industry); Audrey 
Freeman & William E. Fulmer, Last Rites for Pattern Bargaining, HARV. BUS. REV. 30, 40 
(1982) (describing the breakdown of pattern bargaining in the auto and rubber industries); 
Harry C. Katz, The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and 
Comparative Analysis, 47 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 3, 11 (1993) (reporting abandonment of 
pattern bargaining in the steel industry). 
 213. See, e.g., JULIUS G. GETMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS: WHY LABOR LAW IS 
FAILING AMERICAN WORKERS (2016); Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177, at 25–
32; James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1563 (1996); Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1527 (2002). 
 214. See generally Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
 215. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1178.5(b) (West 1980). 
 216. Compare Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129–30 (2019) (plurality 
opinion), with id. at 2139–41 (Gorsuch J., dissenting). 
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standard,217 adding more definiteness or detail could address any ongoing 
delegation concerns. 
A second legal issue is how a tripartite commission and its 
industry-specific boards would interface with NLRA regulation of the 
private-sector workforce.  If the entire structure is federal, there is no issue 
of preemption.  Sector-specific commission decisions, like FLSA wage and 
hour determinations, can co-exist with labor-management regulation, and 
presumably would supplement or complement any applicable CBA 
protections.  However, state commissions and sectoral wage boards may also 
be part of a legislative approach, especially given that transit workers, public 
school teachers, and other FE workers at state and local agencies are not 
uniformly protected under the federal occupational safety and health 
statute.218  If state law authorizes state-level commissions to address 
private-sector industries as well as public employment, there may be 
challenges brought under NLRA preemption doctrine.  Supreme Court 
caselaw could be seen as supportive of such challenges, based on the theory 
that tripartite commission-imposed safety and health protections are a form 
of state-approved bargaining, interfering with what the NLRA expects 
should be left to “the free play of economic forces” between labor and 
management.219 
That said, prospects for success of a Machinists preemption challenge are 
doubtful.220  The existence of a tripartite negotiation process through a state 
commission does not mean the state is pressing its regulatory thumb on the 
scale of individually bargained agreements.  Rather, the result of any 
tripartite effort would be a regulation of broad sectoral applicability.  And 
the Court has declined to limit the authority of states or local governments 
to enact generally applicable employment regulation that extends beyond 
 
 217. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001); see also Opp 
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of Wage & Hour Div. of Dept. of Lab., 312 U.S. 126, 142–46 
(1941) (the Supreme Court unanimously upheld FLSA wage-committee structure against 
charge of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). 
 218. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (excluding states and their subdivisions from the definition of 
“employer”). The federal statute provides that these workers may have OSHA protections if 
they work in a state that has an OSHA-approved state program. See id. § 667. Twenty seven 
states have OSHA-approved plans covering public-sector workers while 23 states do not. See 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ALL ABOUT OSHA (2020), 
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/all_about_OSHA.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT6D-8ATH]. 
 219. See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp. Rels. 
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 147, 149–50 (1976). 
 220. For a more extended discussion of this issue, reaching the same conclusion, see 
Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177, at 90–92. For an in-depth analysis of labor 
preemption application to tripartite lawmaking by state and local governments, see Benjamin 
I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1153, 1197–220 (2011). 
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federal levels of protection.221  Relatedly, the California Supreme Court in 
1980 rejected a Machinists-based preemption challenge to the IWC on this 
ground.222 
Finally, there is a practical issue of whether the tripartite Commission and 
its wage boards will function in ways that are unduly partisan or politicized.  
Past experience of state tripartite commissions authorizing wage increases223 
suggests that governors — directly or through neutral commission members 
— tend to have outsized influence, as labor and management representatives 
often disagree.224  This influence may be an acceptable tradeoff in 
democratic accountability terms for a commission structure that incorporates 
substantial labor and management participation on a sectoral basis.  At the 
same time, following Andrias’s earlier description of the FLSA industry 
committees as a “mix between collective bargaining and administrative 
decision-making,”225 a law could be drafted to bend somewhat toward 
bargaining by providing for a government-appointed arbitrator to resolve 
evenly divided commission outcomes.  And because disagreements over 
sectoral safety and health protections are likely to be more multidimensional 
and complex than wage disputes, the legislation could make use of one of 
three recurring designs from the interest arbitration setting: choosing 
between the two sides’ final offers on each issue in disagreement, choosing 
one complete package of proposals over the other, or exercising discretion 
on each disputed issue.226 
B. Protection for Diverse Forms of Safety and Health Protests 
Unlike the need for a new legislative approach creating industry-wide 
commissions on workplace safety and health, an enhanced right to protest 
hazardous conditions can be achieved through modification of existing labor 
law provisions.  In a seminal law review article, Craig Becker examined how 
the courts and NLRB have restricted the scope of protected strike activity 
 
 221. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756–57 (1985); N.Y. 
Tel. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Lab., 440 U.S. 519, 532–33 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
 222. See Indus. Welfare Comm’n v. Superior Ct., 613 P.2d 579, 600–01 (Cal. 1980) 
(concluding that the Machinists preemption doctrine does not interfere with states’ authority 
to set, inter alia, safety and health standards that exceed what has been bargained for in 
particular agreements). 
 223. In addition to California, this experience includes New York, New Jersey, Colorado, 
and Arizona. See supra notes 186–187. 
 224. See Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177, at 87; Marzan, supra note 178, at 
140. 
 225. Andrias, An American Approach, supra note 181, at 672. 
 226. See Barry Winograd, An Introduction to the History of Interest Arbitration in the 
United States, 61 LAB. L.J. 164, 168 (2010). 
2020] FORSAKEN HEROES 51 
under the NLRA.227  By essentially confining protection to settings where 
strikers entirely abandon their work and remain away from the workplace 
until either reaching a settlement or conceding defeat,228 the law fails to 
credit more limited forms of work stoppage, including slowdowns and 
work-to-rule, intermittent strikes, and refusals to perform specific tasks.229  
This stark binary conception is at odds with the definitional approach to 
strikes under the law of many other countries.230  It also conflicts with the 
approach adopted under international law, which views such limited work 
stoppages as presumptively protected — with restrictions justified only if the 
action ceases to be peaceful.231 
The withered universe of protected strike activity under the NLRA has 
special relevance in the safety and health context.  More than many 
conditions of employment, safety and health are quintessentially collective 
goods.  An individual worker’s successful assertion of the right to eliminate 
an unhealthy or unsafe workplace condition has the inherent and predictable 
effect of benefiting not just that worker but all similarly situated 
employees.232  Further, unlike strikes for improved wages or job security 
 
 227. See Craig Becker, “Better Than a Strike”: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work 
Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1994). 
 228. The concession can take the form of one or more workers crossing the picket line, or 
a broader recognition that the strike has been broken and the workers collectively return to 
whatever jobs remain available. See id. at 354–55. 
 229. See id. at 368–69 (discussing the 1949 Supreme Court Briggs Stratton decision 
deeming intermittent strikes unprotected, and the 1951 Labor Board Elk Lumber decision 
refusing to protect slowdowns). For an in-depth discussion of the law of intermittent strikes, 
see Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 658–69 (2016). 
 230. See BERND WAAS, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 3–5, 52–53 (Bernd 
Waas ed., 2014) (contrasting the “more rigid” legal approach in the United States with 
definitions encompassing various forms of limited work stoppages in Czech Republic, South 
Africa, Turkey, Malaysia, Israel, Italy, Uruguay, and Germany). 
 231. The international jurisprudence is set forth primarily in the work of two key 
supervisory bodies of the International Labor Organization (ILO) (established in 1919 and 
since 1945 a part of the United Nations): the tripartite Committee of Freedom of Association 
(CFA), established in 1951, and the independent Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), established in 1926. See Freedom of 
Association: Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association, INT’L 
LABOUR OFF. 148 (2018), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_632659.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9BY-XBTW]; Giving 
Globalization a Human Face, INT’L LABOUR OFF. 51 (2012), 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_174846.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F59-U932]. See 
generally JEFFREY VOGT ET AL., THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2020) 
(detailing the central role of the ILO and its supervisory bodies in developing and explaining 
the international right). 
 232. The Supreme Court has recognized this reality in the unionized setting. See NLRB v. 
City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 832 (1984). The Labor Board has declined to endorse 
the same position with respect to employees of a non-union company. See Meyers Indus., 
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protections, which often reflect prolonged perceptions of chronic 
mistreatment, protests against life- or health-threatening workplace 
conditions are likely to arise in more acute circumstances and without 
extensive advance planning.  The Supreme Court recognized this difference 
when providing protection to a spontaneous walkout by non-union 
employees protesting extreme winter conditions in an aluminum plant with 
a broken-down furnace.233  But such protection has been largely confined to 
one-off events.  Even if faced with hazardous conditions over a more 
extended period, workers who wish to engage in peaceful short-term or 
intermittent walkouts or slowdowns to protest serious threats to their health 
and safety are simply not protected strikers.234 
Labor law’s existing protections for employees who refuse to engage in 
unsafe work have value, but for reasons discussed earlier, their impact has 
been limited.  Constraints include (i) employees’ need to rely on the 
Secretary of Labor to assert their refusal rights under the OSH Act; (ii) 
restrictions on such refusals under the NLRA, both from no-strike 
agreements that cover unionized workers and from employers’ right to 
permanently replace “protected” strikers whether unionized or not; and (iii) 
the uncertain meaning of “abnormally dangerous conditions for work” under 
Section 502.235 
In order to provide sufficient protection for FE workers and others 
engaged in safety and health protests, certain interrelated changes to existing 
labor law are needed.  Two of these changes are addressed in large-scale 
labor law reform legislation that passed the House earlier this year but is 
unlikely to be taken up in the Senate.236  First, the definition of “protected 
strikes” must be legislatively expanded to cover intermittent or repeated 
safety-related walkouts or slowdowns, with or without a union presence.  
The pending labor law reform bill includes specific language that seems able 
to accomplish this goal by expanding the NLRA section on preserving the 
right to strike.237  Second, the permanent replacement of lawful strikers must 
 
Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885–86 (1986), aff’d sub nom., Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
 233. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14–18 (1962). 
 234. See Becker, supra note 227, at 376–85; Oswalt, supra note 229, at 658–65. See 
generally Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (July 25, 2019). 
 235. See supra Section II.E; supra text accompanying notes 140–149. The NLRA Section 
158(g)’s ten days advance notice requirement for concerted activity by unionized employees 
at healthcare facilities, see supra note 145, raises a separate procedural hurdle with respect to 
urgent safety or health protests in those settings. The advance notice requirement does not 
apply to non-union concerted activities at healthcare facilities. 
 236. See supra note 19 (discussing House passage and dim prospects for enactment in 
116th Congress). 
 237. See Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2020 (PRO Act), H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. 
§ 12(j) (2020) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 163 to provide that “the duration, scope, frequency, or 
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be declared unlawful.  That U.S. law allows for such replacements has been 
the subject of intense and prolonged academic criticism as well as prior 
legislative reform efforts.238  The pending reform bill includes a provision 
prohibiting this practice.239  Assuming the bill as a whole remains stalled in 
the Senate, these two changes deserve separate consideration as part of an 
effort to create meaningful safety and health protections for FE workers. 
The third change to existing labor law provisions involves the language 
of Section 502, which classifies any “good faith” quitting of labor “because 
of abnormally dangerous conditions” as not a strike.  This classification is 
important because it allows workers to protest sufficiently hazardous 
conditions without being subject to the no-strike provision of a collective 
bargaining agreement.  As discussed earlier, there is uncertainty from 
previous court and agency decisions as to the contours of this standard.240  
Stronger protection for FE workers could be secured if the language were 
adjusted to clarify that (a) “good faith” refers to the employees’ subjective 
belief supported by some objective evidence (rather than requiring evidence 
that the abnormally dangerous conditions, in fact, are present), and (b) 
“abnormally dangerous conditions” cover heightened risks to workers’ 
safety and health such as those evident for FE workers under COVID-19, 
even if these conditions do not create immediate life-threatening 
circumstances. 
C. Protection for Immigrant Frontline Essential Workers 
Although reform of the immigration laws is too complex and controversial 
a subject to be taken up here, certain points are worth emphasizing.  Migrant 
workers, including workers who are undocumented, perform a 
disproportionate amount of the FE work in a number of occupations, such as 
 
intermittence of any strike or strikes shall not render such strike or strikes unprotected or 
prohibited”). 
 238. For discussion of academic criticism as well as a sharp increase in the use of 
permanent replacements since 1980, see James J. Brudney, To Strike or Not to Strike, 1999 
WIS. L. REV. 65, 69, 69 n.22, 71–72 (1999) (reviewing JULIUS GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF 
LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS AND PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS (1998)). For 
discussion of congressional efforts at reform in 1992 and 1994 that secured majority support 
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agriculture, meatpacking, building and cleaning services, and home 
healthcare.241  Even before COVID-19, U.S. citizens have shunned these 
occupations as too difficult, dangerous, dirty, or otherwise unattractive.242  
In addition, legal protections provided for FE workers do not adequately 
extend to occupations in which migrants are concentrated.  For instance, 
agricultural workers are covered under the FFCRA, but the carve-outs for 
employers with fewer than 50 or more than 500 employees exempt some 
three-fourths of these workers from paid sick leave protections.243  Further, 
migrants working in agriculture, meatpacking, and other industries must 
endure crowded living conditions and inadequate healthcare services; the 
added influence of these factors contributes to migrant workers suffering far 
greater incidents of illness and death as they perform work that is deemed 
essential for the country.244 
The COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity to assure migrant 
essential workers have the same safety and health protections as others on 
the front lines.  This should include access to sufficient PPE, hazard pay, and 
paid sick leave; protection against retaliation (including threats of 
deportation) when engaged in otherwise lawful safety-based strikes or 
protest action; and opportunities to participate as workers on industry-wide 
commissions or boards established in the future. 
The proposed HEROES Act offers some of these protections.245  An 
additional option involves expanding the current U-Visa program to include 
immigrant workers exposed to serious workplace safety and health 
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violations.246  Broader U-Visa coverage would allow immigrant workers to 
report such hazards and violations to labor regulators without the same fear 
of adverse interaction with immigration enforcement authorities.247  And 
ultimately, if migrant FE workers are to receive equal treatment for the 
recognized valorous nature of their continuing service, their access to a path 
to citizenship should be part of further discussion on reforming our 
immigration laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States is living through its worst public health crisis in more 
than a century, combined with an economic and employment crisis 
reminiscent of the Great Depression, and a national awakening to 
fundamental racial inequalities that rival those confronted in the 1960s.  
Given such a confluence of events, this Article has focused on the grave 
weaknesses of our laws meant to safeguard the health and safety of workers 
in the United States, and especially FE workers. 
At the same time, the crises may serve as a moment of opportunity.  The 
country has been sensitized to the heroic role FE workers play; these men 
and women need and deserve far better workplace protections, for the sake 
of their health, their families, their communities, and their lives.  This Article 
has examined how particular reforms can reshape our regulatory approach to 
workplace safety and health protections, and thereby enhance workers’ 
capacity to express legitimate needs and assure rights to meaningful 
protection.  Whether these or similar legislative measures will emerge from 
the present crises — as occurred in the context of prior national emergencies 
and moments of opportunity — remains to be seen. 
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